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SUMMARY
Judicial review of arbitration awards is highly deferential-but when does it
become rubber stamping? Using original data, I find that federal courts vacated
only 4.3 percent of 162 disputed arbitration awards. A sub-sample of forty-four
employment discrimination arbitration awards under Title VII produced similar
results. By comparison, federal Courts of Appeals in 2006 reversed 12.9 percent
of 5,917 rulings made by civil court judges on the merits of legal claims.
Why are the rulings of Article III judges scrutinized more than the awards of
citizen-arbitrators? What does this mean when companies can avoid Article III
court rulings by requiring employees to arbitrate their claims? Judicial review of
awards based on statutory claims is inadequate and undermines the constitutional
role of federal courts.
I explore these empirical findings from a historical perspective. English
kings and merchants helped to fashion modem arbitration. Nearly 700 years ago,
small merchants traded goods at fairs that operated under a royal franchise. Arbitrators improved the efficiency of these markets by adjudicating transactional
disputes. This role was codified by the Statute of the Staple of 1353, where the
king delegated his sovereign power to ensure the success of the fair.
I point to two prominent junctures-in 1698, and again in 1925-when lawmakers in England and the U.S. believed that litigation hampered commerce.
They enacted similar statutes to authorize courts to confirm disputed arbitration
awards, unless corruption or misconduct caused these private rulings. This deference grew out of practical considerations. The parties had chosen the arbitrator,
agreed to the private process, and bound themselves to an industry norm.
Courts deferred so heavily to awards because William Ill wanted these merhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss1/2
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chant tribunals to be autonomous. His law, the Arbitration Act of 1698, did not
allow courts to vacate awards for fact-finding or legal errors. Great deference in
its reviewing standards reflected the king's infallibility.
My textual research shows that the Federal Arbitration Act's ("FAA") reviewing standards descended from the policies of William Ill. I suggest that our
law crowns today's statutory arbitrator with the king's mantle of infallibility. But
this deference is too extreme for awards that rule on statutory claims. In Gilmer v.
Johnson/InterstateLane Corp., the Supreme Court ignored the commercial history
of arbitration when it broadly approved a theory of forum substitution.' Gilmer
said that arbitrators may decide statutory claims, even if one disputant objects to
the forum and wishes, instead, to be heard by a court. The result is that the ruling
of the arbitrator is subject to a narrower standard of review than an Article III
judge's order. Epitomizing this regal deference, a contemporary court said: "The
arbiter was chosen to be the Judge. That Judge has spoken. There it ends."' In
textual and empirical analysis, I show that statutory arbitrations enjoy a presumption of royal infallibility. I conclude with two solutions for aligning the review of
rulings by statutory arbitrators and Article HI judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview: Arbitrationand Courts
Do arbitrations help courts reduce their caseload, or do they usurp a constitutional role by empowering private citizens to exercise an unchecked governmental
power? Trials are vanishing.3 Federal judgeships remain vacant.4 Case filings hit
a high point in 1985 before leveling off.5 Meanwhile, arbitration is booming.
Caseloads rival the litigation volume in federal7 courts.6 Private adjudication is
growing, even though arbitration fees are costly.
But courts do not perceive arbitration as an institutional threat. They create
1. See 500 U.S. 20 (1990).
2. Safeway Stores v. Am. Bakery & Confectionary Works Int'l Union, Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 84
(5th Cir. 1968).
3. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 521 (2004) (the number of civil trials per
federal district court judge fell from 22.3 in 1987 to 7.4 in 2002).
4. E. Stewart Moritz, "StatisticalJudo ": The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction in the JudicialAppointment Process, 22 J.L. & POL. 341, 374-75 (2006). October vacancies during the Reagan, Bush I, and
Clinton presidencies were, respectively, 115 of 642 (17.9%), 57 of 731 (7.8%), and 122 of 811
(15.0%). Id. at 375.
5. Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1255, 1264, n.23. Civil trials peaked in 1985, when the number of filings reached 273,056. Id. It stayed
essentially level thereafter: for example, in 2002, there were 274,711 filings. Id.
6. Williams S. Fiske, Comment, Should Small and Medium-Size American Businesses "Going
Global" Use InternationalCommercial Arbitration?, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 455, 461 (2005) (reporting that the American Arbitration Association handled the largest number of arbitrations globally,
198,491 in 2001).
7. See Scovill v. WSYX/ABC, 425 F.3d 1012, 1020 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming a district court's
findings of arbitration forum costs as follows: filing fee, $3,250; case service fee, $1,250, and daily
rate for arbitrator fees, $1,260). Overall, the district court found that the minimum arbitration costs
would be $15,310 for a four-day arbitration and pre-hearing motions and conferences, and arbitrator
study time. Id.
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demand for private "judges" in decisions that foster arbitration. 8 Migration of
Article III trials to arbitration relieves congested dockets. Arbitration also gives
disputants a better chance of receiving a hearing because this forum is less encumbered by technical pleading rules and discovery procedures. Disputants may
9
enjoy process advantages compared to a trial-lower cost and a quicker ruling.
The wholesale privatization of the judicial process raises questions, however,
about the administration of justice. Many arbitrations result from compulsory
agreements, where a powerful entity, such as an employer, requires a weaker party
to waive any right to a trial as a condition for entering into an economic relationship.' o To some observers, this amounts to a coerced bargain." The power imbalance in mandatory arbitration agreements may undermine fairness in the resulting adjudication.12
My empirical research-discussed in this article-examines a crucial interface between public and private spheres of dispute resolution O,- constitutional
system is based, of course, on checks and balances. I posit that a landmark 1991
decision, Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 3 minimizes the role of Article
III courts in performing judicial review. By requiring an employment discrimination complaint to be sent to arbitration, this decision set a precedent for limiting a
discrimination plaintiff's access to court.
8. E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (stating a presumption to
enforce arbitration agreements that impose cost-sharing obligations on poor individuals: "To invalidate
the agreement on that basis would undermine the 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.' It would also conflict with our prior holdings that the party resisting arbitration bears the
burden of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration") (internal citations omitted).
See also, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (ruling that all employment
arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA, except a small sliver of agreements that cover
transportation workers).
9. Richard A. Bales, Normative Considerationsof Employment Arbitrationat Gilmer's Quinceailera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 343 (2006); David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration:A New Pathfor EmpiricalResearch, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1578-80 (2005).
10. In mandatory arbitration, one party conditions a contractual benefit or entitlement-for example,
employment or use of credit card-on the other party's agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration,
instead of a court. Because the arbitration clause is a non-negotiable condition for the contractual
relationship, it is called mandatory. For an example in this study's sample, see Tinder v. Pinkerton
Security, where the former employee contended that the contract was illusory and unilaterally imposed.
305 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 2002). Compare to voluntary arbitration agreements, such as the contract
in Window Concepts, Inc. v. Daly. No. Civ.A. 99-434, 2001 WL 1452790, at *1-*2 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Nov. 2, 2001).
11. Examples include Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1711 (2006); Judith Resnik, Symposium, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based ProcessesAre at Risk,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521 (2006); Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling In the Dark? CorporateFraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV.
1029 (2004); Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition ofArbitration by Those with SuperiorBargaining
Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857 (1999); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitrationand the Goals of Employment DiscriminationLaw, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395 (1999); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic
Justice: Community and Coercion Under the FederalArbitrationAct, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999).
12. Gayle Cinquegrani, Arbitration: Subcommittee Gives FavorableReport to Bill Limiting Arbitration Clauses in Job Contracts, EMP. POL'L & L. DAILY (BNA), July 16, 2008, at d17 (reporting on the
progress of Arbitration Fairness Act (H.R. 3010)). Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.), the bill's principal
sponsor charged that "[b]ig business has used its substantial muscle" to expand mandatory arbitration.
In a hearing on a companion bill in the Senate (S. 1782), Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) agreed, stating
that mandatory arbitration is "slowly eroding the constitutional rights of Americans." Id.
13. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
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Consider identical employment discrimination claims, one tried before a federal court and the other arbitrated before a private citizen. In both cases, suppose
that the judge and arbitrator mistakenly apply the remedy provision under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 Because court judgments are subject to
broader review than arbitration awards, the court's legal error is more correctable
than the arbitrator's mistake. As more employment discrimination cases are arbitrated, it can be inferred that Article III courts correct fewer legal errors. My
study puts this theory to an empirical test.
Judicial review serves a vital constitutional function. Not only does it correct
legal errors, it also provides guidance when the law is unclear and promotes uniform interpretation.' 5 When arbitrators decide claims that arise under federal
statutes, they exercise the same kind of power as an Article II trial judge. Unlike
a court judgment, the arbitrator's ruling is reviewed with extreme deference. The
award is not alterable; however, Article III court rulings may be modified and
corrected.
This constitutional dichotomy surfaced only recently. 16 In 1991, Gilmer said
that the FAA ended long-standing judicial hostility to arbitration.' 7 The FAA
directed courts to enforce the arbitration process in two respects-by ordering a8
recalcitrant party to an arbitration agreement to submit to that private process,'
19

and by confirming arbitrator rulings.

My historical research shows that the Six-

14. An example appears in Pollard v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. 532 U.S. 843 (2001). The
1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII by allowing discrimination victims to recover up to $300,000
in compensatory damages. 42 U.S.C § 1981a(b)(3)(d) (2000). This supplemented the strong remedial
provisions in Title VII. Pollard,532 U.S at 850-52. In this case, after the district court found that a
female worker experienced flagrant discrimination, the court awarded her $300,000 in compensatory
damages. Id. at 845. The trial court said that it wanted to award more in compensatory damages under
the Civil Rights Act of 1991- based on the fact that Sharon Pollard could not return to her former job
because of a severe and continuing hostile work environment- but declined to award future damages
because the court believed that the law's cap on "future pecuniary loss" also applied to front pay. Id. at
847. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that front pay did not count against the $300,000 limit. Id. at
848. On remand, the trial court awarded Pollard approximately $2.2 million in compensatory damages
(for back pay, front pay and infliction of emotional distress) and $2.5 million in punitive damages on
the emotional distress claim. Pollard v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, Inc., 412 F.3d 657, 659 (6th Cir.
2005).
15. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,213 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Unlike a legislature, we do not promulgate new rules of constitutional ... procedure on a broad
basis. Rather, the nature of judicial review requires that we adjudicate specific cases, and each
case usually becomes the vehicle for announcement of a new rule. But after we have decided a
new rule in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that rule to all
similar cases pending on direct review...
Id. (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)).
16. See Sen. Russell D. Feingold, MandatoryArbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 281, 288 (2002) ("One reason that mandatory, binding arbitration has become so troubling is
because it threatens a fundamental principle of our justice system: the constitutional right to take a
dispute to court").
17. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (observing that the purpose of
the FAA was "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at
English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts").
18. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§
1-16 (2000), renamed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1947. See Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, § 1, 43
Stat. 883, amended by Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669.(authorizing courts to order parties to
arbitrate their dispute, provided that a valid agreement exists).
19. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (authorizing courts to vacate an award).
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ty-Eighth Congress in 1925, and King William III and Parliament in 1698, responded to similar concerns from the business community about the high cost of
litigation. Businesses wanted a simpler, cheaper, and internally administered
justice system to resolve their common law claims. When English and American
arbitrators adjudicated these contract and related claims over the centuries, they
rarely applied or interpreted a federal statute. These private judges were common
law arbitrators but not statutory arbitrators.
Congress, in passing the FAA, assumed that common law arbitrators would
continue to hear the same types of merchant and commercial cases that had been
arbitrated for the preceding 300 years. My empirical research shows, however,
that following the landmark Gilmer decision in 1991, arbitrators often rule on
statutory employment discrimination claims. The problem is that the FAA blindly
equates common law and statutory arbitrations. But, these arbitrations are fundamentally different. In my view, statutory arbitrations require an arbitrator to apply
legislative terms and appropriate public law precedents; however, in common law
arbitrations, arbitrators usually apply industry or commercial standards that either
implicitly or explicitly underlie the arbitration agreement.
Thus, courts may review statutory awards with too much deference-for example, by ignoring a party's express statutory rights that are curtailed in the arbitration agreement, or by allowing arbitrators to deny a victorious claimant a statutory right to attorney's fees. In short, by focusing on the arbitrator's adherence to
the underlying contract, courts may overlook a claimant's rights under public law.
I contend that Gilmer cannot have it both ways: it cannot posit forum substitution-extinguishing the right to sue on the notion that arbitration provides the
same justice as courts-and also forgo the usual standard of review for judicial
rulings on grounds that arbitrations deserve more deference than courts. By privatizing the civil justice system, Gilmer tends to retard the evolution of public law.
Courts are called upon less often to determine how public laws apply to new or
changing social conditions. And because arbitrators do not routinely publish their
awards, the public lacks important information about the outcomes of disputes that
involve a public law issue.
This unplanned transition to statutory arbitration also raises disquieting questions under the separation of powers doctrine because private arbitrators increasingly exercise powers that Congress reserved for federal courts when it enacted
employment laws. When arbitrators hear statutory cases that ordinarily arise under federal jurisdiction, are they bound like Article III judges to apply statutory
terms and judicial precedents? If the arbitration agreement alters terms of an antidiscrimination law such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-by limiting
remedies, class actions, or filing periods-are arbitrators bound by the contract or
the discrimination statute? Under the FAA, are arbitrator rulings reversed less
frequently by courts than trial court judgments? If so, what are the implications
for Article III courts?
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B. Organizationof This Article
Gilmer involved a complaint under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA"). 2 0 Given the context of this key employment discrimination case,
Part II explains why many employers began to require their workers to arbitrate
legal disputes after Gilmer was decided. Additionally, I show that arbitration
procedures deviate from those in lawsuits, and that arbitrators lack the powers and
qualifications of federal judges. I conclude that Gilmer errs in assuming that arbitration is a valid substitute for trials involving statutory claims, and recent reforms
have not brought arbitration up to par with trials.
The picture differs for common law arbitrations-private tribunals that adjudicate contract and other commercial claims. In Part III, I show how common law
arbitrations evolved separately from statutory arbitrations. I also refute the idea,
held by American lawmakers in 1925, that English courts were hostile to arbitration.
Part IV explores two postulates. If Gilmer is right about forum substitution,
then federal courts should vacate arbitration awards and reverse trial court rulings
at the same rate. But I consider another possibility in Part IV: federal courts
should not overturn arbitration awards and judicial judgments with the same frequency because the FAA's language and legislative history show an intention to
shield arbitration awards from the usual amount of scrutiny.
Part V describes my research methods and is followed by my empirical results. Part VI interprets the results in light of constitutional theory and practice. I
conclude in Part VII that current court opinions treat arbitration with an aura of
royal infallibility, and I propose two modest but practical ideas to address this
problem.
II. STATUTORY ARBITRATIONS: THE INFERIORITY OF ARBITRATORS TO
ARTICLE III JUDGES IN ADJUDICATING DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. Employers Prefer Arbitrationto Trialsfor Adjudicating
Statutory Claims
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court enforced a mandatory arbitration agreement in
the securities industry. 2' The agreement asserted that financial services manager
Robert Gilmer waived his right to sue under the ADEA.22 Notably, the Supreme
Court returned to the employment discrimination setting to broaden Gilmer's narrow holding--thereby denying
23 most employees access to court and compelling
arbitration of their claims. In a critical passage, the Gilmer majority proclaimed
20. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
21. Id. at 36.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Gilmer dealt with a securities industry arbitration provision that happened to arise in the context
of an employment dispute. Id. Gilmer did not decide, therefore, whether Section 1 of the FAA- which
defined contracts that are excluded from the Act's coverage- applied to all employees, or only a
narrow class. Id. at 25, n.2. The Court stated, "it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § I
exclusion because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment." Id. The Court removed this ambiguity in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, by mling that all
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its trust in forum substitution-the idea that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute;
it only
24
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."
Thus, while Gilmer applied to arbitration agreements regardless of the type of
dispute, this precedent and its immediate progeny dealt with employment discrimination claims. By selecting cases with these types of arbitration agreements, the
Court appeared to signal a concern for employers who defend discrimination
claims.
Thus, it is appropriate to consider the relationship between mandatory arbitration and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Congress enacted this law to
eradicate discrimination in the workplace.
Recent Supreme Court
decisions
26
highlight the crucial role that federal judges play in clarifying the law.
Nonetheless, Gilmer appears to blunt the effect of these clarifying decisions
by channeling discrimination disputes to a forum where these legal principles may
be overlooked. Consider the critical timing of the Gilmer decision. Employers
were alarmed by two major employment laws, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,27 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.28 Employment discrimination lawsuits in federal courts more than doubled in five years, as filings soared from
8,273 in 1990 to 19,059 in 1995.29
Even if these trends caused employers to worry about increased liability and
costs, Congress believed it was more important to strengthen these antidiscrimination laws. Gilmer, however, offered employers an easy way out of this
rising tide of litigation.
Hoping to lower the cost of employment disputes, many employers used arbitration agreements to bypass courts. In a late 1990s national survey, most Foremployment arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA, except agreements that cover
transportation workers. 532 U.S. 105, 117-19 (2001).
24. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
25. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)). This explicit purpose appears in the legislative
history for Title VII, when Congress stated that "the failure of our society to extend job opportunities
to the Negro is an economic waste." H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1963), reprinted in EEOC Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 2122, 2149.
See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("The objective of Congress in the
enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
white employees over other employees").
26. In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 70-71 (2006), the Court
broadened the meaning of retaliatory discrimination, while Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454,
456 (2006), guided courts in evaluating racially tinged epithets, such as a supervisor's use of "boy" in
referring to African-American employees.
27. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scatted sections of 42 U.S.C).
28. American with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
29. The Federal Judiciary, U.S. District Court Cases, Civil Cases Filed By Nature of Suit, Table 4.4,
at 2 (see Employment, under the heading Civil Rights, at Line 3), available at
http:l/www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/'Table4O4.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
30. See Arbitration:Attorney Urges Employers to Adopt MandatoryProgramsas Risk-Management,
93 DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA) (May 14, 2001), at A-5 (reporting an employment lawyer's view that
mandatory arbitration helps employers limit damages and eliminate class action lawsuits. David Copus
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tune 1000 companies reported that they use employment arbitration. 31 Ninety
percent of the companies that used employment arbitration said that they adopted
an ADR method as a "critical cost-control technique. 32 Commentators
concluded
33
that arbitration enabled employers to limit litigation risks and CoStS.
B. Arbitration ProceduresDeviatefrom Civil Court Procedures
Gilmer approved mandatory arbitration as forum substitution, implying that
the process would be scrupulously neutral. But some employers manipulate arbitration procedures to enhance their chances of defeating claims. Companies write
arbitration agreements that allow them to manage risk by eliminating jury trials,
class actions, and large attorney's fees.34
Also, arbitration agreements require workers to waive their right to sue,35 thereby replacing litigation with arbitration.36 Often, workers cannot bargain over
this forum. 3 7 Even when employers provide voluntary arbitration, it may be illusory because workers3 must promptly exercise an opt-out clause or acquiesce to the
arbitration provision. 8
Companies create their own rules to shield themselves from stricter enforcement.39 Risk control tactics include limits on discovery, n° shorter periods to file
claims, 4 1 selection of arbitrators without employee input,42 and inconvenient vealso notes that the biggest financial risk for employers in termination lawsuits-tort claims in which a
single plaintiff can be awarded millions of dollars- is controlled by arbitration agreements that cap
damages).
31. See Alternative Dispute Resolution: Most Large Employers Prefer ADR as Alterative to Litigation, Survey Says, 93 DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA) (May 14, 1997), at A-4 (79% of the 530 responding
firms said that they use employment arbitration).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289 (1998); David B. Lipsky &
Ronald L. Seeber, Patternsof ADR Use in CorporateDisputes, 54 DisP. RESOL. J. 66 (1999); Francis
J. Mootz 11H,Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3
(1997) ("For many employers, managing this risk of liability is a vital part of their human resources
mission and an important part of their general corporate cost-control program").
34. Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach To Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861, 862
(2004). See also David S. Schwartz, UnderstandingRemedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity,
Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49 (2003) (contending that employers use
arbitration as a risk-management device).
35. E.g., Baldeo v. Darden Rests., Inc., 2005 WL 44703, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
36. E.g., Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2004).
37. E.g., Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
38. E.g., Legair v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 213 F. App'x. 436, 437 (6th Cir. 2007).
39. See DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT:
LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROFESSIONALS (Jossey-Bass 2003).
40. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
41. See, e.g., Marie v. Allied Home Mort. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 11 (1 st Cir. 2005) (ruling that arbitrator
had authority to rule on validity of sixty-day filing requirement); Louis v. Geneva Enters., Inc., 128 F.
Supp. 2d 912, 916-17 (E.D. Va.2001) (the sixty-day filing limit in arbitration agreement drafted by the
employer unlawfully conflicts with three year statute of limitations for FLSA claims); Chappel v. Lab.
Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 726-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (because ERISA provides a four-year statute of
limitations for an action to recover benefits under a written contract, plan administrator breached its
fiduciary duty by adopting a mandatory arbitration clause that set a sixty-day time limit in which to
demand arbitration).
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nues. 43 In addition, some arbitration agreements not only bar access to courts, but
deter employee access to arbitration by requiring individuals to pay large forum
fees. 44 Once the arbitrator has been appointed and the hearing commences, there
may be more deviations from ordinary judicial process. Some arbitration agreements bar class actions, 45 include remedial limits on statutory claims, 46 and limit
punitive damages in awards.47

C. Title VII ArbitratorsLack the Qualificationsand Powers of
Article III Judges
There are other reasons to question whether arbitration offers employees the
same outcomes that they could expect from a court. Gilmer's forum substitution
concept implies that arbitrators are private judges who are similar in ability and
outlook to Article III judges.48
However, since the advent of employment arbitration, arbitrator qualifications
have come under fire. A few arbitrators have been exposed as biased or incompetent. 49 More often, employment arbitrators have lacked diversity and subjectmatter expertise. The General Accounting Office ("GAO"), a research arm of
Congress, conducted a comprehensive analysis of employment arbitration soon
after Gilmer was decided. 50 Focusing on the securities industry, the study estimated that a typical arbitrator for the New York Stock Exchange was a white,

42. See Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the only possible
purpose of the employer's arbitration rules was "to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding").
43. E.g., Poole v. L.S. Holding, Inc., No. 2001-57, 2001 WL 1223748, at *4 (V.L 2001) (rejecting
contention by Virgin Islands' employee that Massachusetts is a prohibitively expensive venue to arbitrate claim).
44. See Morison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding "the potential costs of arbitrating the dispute easily reach thousands, if not tens of thousands, of dollars, far exceeding the costs that a plaintiff would incur in court").
45. E.g., Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 628, 645 (S.D. W.Va. 2001).
46. E.g., Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 203 F.3d 821, 822 (4th Cir. 2000); Morrison v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 679 (6th Cir. 2003) (although Title VII permits up to $300,000 in
punitive damages, court upheld $162,000 limit imposed by arbitration agreement).
47. E.g., Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 225 (3d Cir. 1997). For an example of
biased employment arbitrators, see Hooters of America v. Phillips, describing how employers unilaterally select arbitrators. 173 F.3d 933, 938-939 (4th Cir. 1999).
48. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) ("Gilmer first speculates
that arbitration panels will be biased. However, '[W]e decline to indulge the presumption that the
parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent,
conscientious and impartial arbitrators"' (internal citations omitted)).
49. E.g., Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998). In its ruling to vacate an
award that denied a broker's age discrimination claim, the Second Circuit court remarked: "In view of
the strong evidence that Halligan was fired because of his age and the agreement of the parties that the
arbitrators were correctly advised of the applicable legal principles, we are inclined to hold that they
ignored the law or the evidence or both." Id.
50. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chaiman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications & Finance, Committee on Energy & Commerce, House of Representatives, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRININATIoNHow REGISTERED REPRESENTATIvES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DIsPuTEs, 1- 2
(Mar.
30,
1994)
[hereinafter
EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION],
available
at
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat4/151196.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). The GAO study reported that
only eighteen employment discrimination arbitrations occurred in the securities industry between
August 1990 and December 1992. Id. at 25.
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sixty-year-old male. 5' The report reached the same52conclusion for National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") arbitrators.
In so many words, parts of the GAO report suggested that the securities industry arbitration system had built-in biases against women and minorities. These
concerns were more pointedly raised in a key lawsuit that alleged structural bias in
securities industry arbitration panels. A female plaintiff realized through discovery that only one member of the NASD's National Arbitration Committee had
experience in employment law. 53 The GAO Report raised a similar concern,
while also explaining that nearly ninety percent of securities industry arbitrations
involved commercial disputes. 54
A fundamental problem is that the employer-typically, the party who drafts
the arbitration agreement-fashions the selection process and defines the arbitrator's powers. To highlight a key difference, in Title VII trials, judges are authorized to order attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 55 But some states prohibit
this remedy in arbitrations, 56 or deny this power to the arbitrator and require the
arbitration winner to go to court to secure this remedy.57 When the law does not
regulate this power, the award of attorney's fees is sometimes vacated on grounds
that the arbitration agreement did not authorize this power.58 The fact that these
limitations do not apply to Article III judges raises doubts about Gilmer's theory
of forum substitution.

D. A Patchworkof Reforms Fails to Eliminate the QualificationsDisparity
Between Article III Judges and Arbitrators
Several reforms in the past decade have significantly improved arbitration by
creating a more level playing field for parties who are required to submit their
disputes to this forum. In the late 1990s, major arbitration services enacted procedural reforms. As Congress prepared to regulate securities industry employment,
the NASD revised its procedures. 59 The American Arbitration Association

51. Id. at 2. At the time, 89 percent of the NYSE's 726 arbitrators were males. Id.
52. Id. at 8.
53. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 210 n. 25 (D.
Mass. 1998) (Deposition of Deborah Masucci).
54. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 50, at 7 (observing that from January 1991
through December 1992, 1,886 NASD cases were arbitrated. Most cases-l,626 (86%)-involved
disputes between customers and brokerage finns, while only 260 cases (14%) dealt with employment
issues. Among these, only two cases involved discrimination).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) ("In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... reasonable attorney's fees... .
56. E.g., Carson v. PaineWebber, Inc., 62 P.3d 996, 1000 (Colo. App. 2002).
57. E.g., Cassedy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 751 So.2d 143, 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (citing Lee v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 626 So.2d 969, 970 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993)) ("[O]ur court's long-established policy has been to exclude the resolution of attorney's fee
demands from the arbitrators' authority; Florida defers instead to the expertise of trial judges").
58. E.g., Moore v. Onmicare, Inc., 118 F.3d 141, 150 (Idaho 2005).
59. See SEC Release No. 34-40858, OrderApproving ProposedRule Change by the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. Relating to Arbitration Rules, 64 Fed. Reg. 1051-01 (Jan. 7, 1999). In December 1998,
the Securities and Exchange Commission amended NYSE Rules 347 and 600 "to exclude claims of
employment discrimination, including sexual harassment, in violation of a statute from arbitration
unless the parties have agreed to arbitrate the claim after it has arisen." Id.
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6
("AAA") followed a similar course by adopting due process procedures. 0
In 2000, a national panel of experts approved a model arbitration law for
states, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ("RUAA"). 61 The RUAA drafters
62
identified numerous issues that required updating contemporary arbitration.
Many of these provisions aimed to endow arbitrators with the attributes and powers of a judge. The model law broke new ground by regulating arbitrator neutrality. 63 It expanded arbitrator powers to order discovery, rule on summary judgment
64
motions, conduct pre-hearing conferences, and manage arbitration processes.
Also, it authorized courts to enforce a pre-award ruling.
RUAA drafters also regulated arbitral remedies.
A new section authorized
67
arbitrators to order attorney's fees, punitive damages, and other exemplary relief.
In cases where a party prevailed in litigation over a disputed arbitration award, the
RUAA also allowed courts to award attorney's fees and costs
to a prevailing par69
ty. 68 In addition, the RUAA strengthened arbitral finality.
Taken together, these reforms have put arbitration on more even footing with
Article III courts. 70 Still, there is no reason to believe that arbitrators appointed by
the AAA or the NASD are as qualified as Article III judges. Even if they were,
Article III judges often preside over jury trials, where peers of the litigants play a
fundamental role in administering justice. Even under ideal conditions-for ex-

60. The American Arbitration Association revised its procedures for mediation and arbitration of
employment disputes to ensure due process for employees. The American Arbitration Association,
Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures(The FairnessIssue and Due Process Protocol), available at http://adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904#the (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
61. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Law, UNtF. ARBITRATION AcT, Prefatory Note (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbitratl2l3.htm (last visited
Apr. 13, 2009).
62. Id. The RUAA list includes fourteen issues for which the UAA did not provide any guidance:
(1) who decides the arbitrability of a dispute and by what criteria; (2) whether a court or arbitrators may issue provisional remedies; (3) how a party can initiate an arbitration proceeding; (4)
whether arbitration proceedings may be consolidated; (5) whether arbitrators are required to disclose facts reasonably likely to affect impartiality; (6) what extent arbitrators or an arbitration organization are immune from civil actions; (7) whether arbitrators or representatives of arbitration
organizations may be required to testify in another proceeding; (8) whether arbitrators have the
discretion to order discovery, issue protective orders, decide motions for summary dispositions,
hold pre-hearing conferences and otherwise manage the arbitration process; (9) when a court may
enforce a pre-award ruling by an arbitrator; (10) what remedies an arbitrator may award, especially in regard to attorney's fees, punitive damages or other exemplary relief; (11) when a court
can award attorney's fees and costs to arbitrators and arbitration organizations; (12) when a court
can award attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing party in an appeal of an arbitrator's award;
(13) which sections of the UAA would not be waivable; particularly when one party has significantly less bargaining power than another; and (14) the use of electronic information in the arbitration process.
Id.
63. Id. at §12.
64. Id. at §17.
65. Id. at §18.
66. Id.
at §21.
67. Id. at §21(a)-(b).
68. Id.at §25.
69. Id. at §25, Cmt. 3 ("Section 25(c) promotes the statutory policy of finality of arbitration awards
by adding a provision for recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable expenses of litigation
to prevailing parties in contested judicial actions to confirm, vacate, modify or correct an award").
70. The RUAA is a model law, created by experts, for use by state legislatures that are interested in
revising their arbitration laws.
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ample, where each party selects an arbitrator, and the two arbitrators select a neutral third arbitrator-arbitration cannot provide this due process enhancement. In
any event, only twelve states have adopted the RUAA, thus limiting the reach of
its reforms.71
mll. COMMON LAW ARBITRATIONS: ARBITRATORS ARE SUPERIOR TO
ARTICLE 1H JUDGES IN ADJUDICATING CONTRACT CLAIMS
In this section, I show how common law arbitrations separately evolved from
statutory arbitrations. In this brief overview, I relate the previous section to my
concern that the limited standards for reviewing arbitration awards undermine
judicial review of public law adjudications.
The following historical materials cannot be found in current arbitration studies, leading court opinions, or the legislative history of the FAA. This omission
skews our understanding of the law's judicial review standards. When judges
apply these standards today, they recognize that Congress enacted these terms
with the idea of preventing courts from interfering with arbitrations.
But their understanding is, perhaps, superficial. Lacking the original legislative context, judges can only apply these words mechanically. This is a problem
because the FAA borrowed standards that evolved from over 200 years of common law arbitrations, where merchants and businesses entered into arm's length
arbitration agreements. Courts adopted very deferential reviewing standards as a
pragmatic response to merchants and businesses that persuasively argued for independence from judicial interference.
This commercial context differs from statutory arbitration of public rightsrights that are usually the subject of federal court proceedings. A trial judge's
ruling is subject to broader review than the same ruling by an arbitrator. Appellate review enables Article HI courts to ensure that laws are enforced as Congress
intended. However, when the same statutory claim is arbitrated and then reviewed
by a court, the standard changes-and it becomes exceedingly deferential. This
transformation upsets the checks and balances between the Article III courts and
Congress.
Conversely, this constitutional problem does not arise in common law arbitrations.72 Common law courts gave these private rights a more public character by
adopting privately adjudicated commercial doctrines. In these cases, it is therefore appropriate for courts to use a more deferential review; this deference standard should not, however, be extended to present day statutory arbitrations.
In the following discussion, I show that the FAA's Section 10 results from a
complex evolution: (1) Arbitration emerged as a commercial dispute resolution
process; (2) English policy makers in the seventeenth century believed that arbitration improved their economy by allowing businesses to avoid expense and delay
from commercial lawsuits; (3) An English statute in 1698 set forth part of the text
71. See American Arbitration Association, RUAA and UMA Legislation from Coast to Coast,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION TIMEs (2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=26600 (last visited
Apr. 13, 2009). The states are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.
72. At times, the underlying legal rights originate in doctrines that first surfaced in arbitrations
centuries ago.
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of Section 10 in the FAA; (4) Contrary to congressional belief when lawmakers
passed the FAA in 1925, English courts were not hostile to arbitration; (5) English
courts adhered to the 1698 arbitration statute by applying deferential principles in
reviewing disputed awards; (6) Early American courts-from the 1820s and later-followed the English approach of confirming disputed awards and only vacated awards on very narrow grounds.
A. Arbitration Emerged as a Commercial Dispute Resolution Process
Arbitration was common in medieval England. Trade, which was irregular
due to primitive roads and social isolation, took place at seasonal fairs under the
king's auspices.73 While issuing a franchise to hold a fair, kings authorized the
creation of merchant courts to adjudicate commercial disputes.74
Commercial arbitration as we know it today grew out of this royal tradition.
The Statute of the Staple, enacted in 1353, allowed merchants to choose impartial
peers to adjudicate their disputes. 75 Over centuries, merchants developed a specialized body of mercantile law to resolve their own disputes. 76 As trade increased
and became more routine in the Age of Reason, merchants entered into arbitration
agreements.77
Near the turn of the seventeenth century, there were few published arbitration
cases. But in 1610, Baspole's Case78 set the tone for judicial deference to arbitration rulings. The court considered whether an award that ruled on one aspect of a
debt effectively resolved all collateral issues, even though the ruling was silent on
these matters: "[I]t appears by the award that it was made . . . de proemissis
proced in conditone proced specificat, which words imply, that he had made an
arbitrament of all that which was referred to him, and so shall it be intended until
the contrary be shewed .... ,,79 By this statement, the decision appeared to lend
judicial support to the notion that the parties should decide whether they will resolve a dispute by final and binding arbitration.
B. King William III Believed that Arbitration Would Improve
England'sEconomy
In seventeenth century England, judges and arbitrators were in competition
with each other to hear commercial disputes. Josiah Child, an economist who
authored A New Discourse of Trade80 in 1669, lamented that business disputes
73. See William C. Jones, An Inquiry into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in
Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 447 (1958).
74. Id. at 447-48.
75. Id. at 449 (quoting The Statute of the Staple: ... the merchants stranger shall chus two merchants strangers, whereof the one towards the South, and the other towards the North, shall be assigned
to sit with the mayor and constaples of the staples... to hear the plaints touching merchants aliens...
11).

76. Id. at 448.
77. Id. at 450.
78. 8 Co. Rep. 97 b (1610) (copy on file with the author).
79. Id. (providing alternative methods of incorporating the arbitration agreement in "in their Submission or Promise or Condition of their respective Bonds...").
80. SIR JOSIAH CHILD, A NEW DISCOURSE OF TRADE (London, J. Hodges et. al., 4th ed. 1745). The
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were too often litigated. Sounding an optimistic note about the future of arbitration, he concluded that "this Kingdom will at length be blessed with a happy method, for the speedy, easy, and cheap deciding of differences between Merchants,
Masters of Ships, and seamen by some Court or Courts of Merchant." 81 Conventional litigation in courts of law caused "tedious attendance
and vast expenses"
82
that tended to result in "empty purses and grey heads."
Toward the close of the 1600s, excessive litigation hindered England's economy. Public policy was needed to support private commercial tribunals. In 1698,
King William III and Parliament enacted a law that authorized courts to enforce
arbitration agreements and awards.
John Locke-the same Locke who influenced American constitutional framers-helped to shape this statute. 83 He recognized the value of arbitration for
resolving trade disputes. 84 But arbitration needed legal reform to be effective. In
his view, the process needed to be "decisive without appeal., 8 5 His word choice
has a contemporary meaning, equating to our society's common usage of the
terms "final and binding" arbitration.
In 1697, Locke drafted two legislative proposals to strengthen the functioning
and autonomy of arbitration. First, he proposed making private arbitration agreements enforceable in courts. 86 Thus, a private agreement to submit a dispute to
arbitration would operate like a court reference, a process by which courts ordered
arbitration.8 788 Locke also proposed language to subject a defaulting party to judicial process.
Locke's proposals joined a wider effort to enact an arbitration statute. William III commissioned a board of trade to reform business practices. 89 Members
recommended Locke's ideas. 9° By February 1698, its arbitration proposals were
91
taken up by the House of Lords. The king signed the law on May 16, 1698.92
C. An English Statute Provided the Antecedents for Section 10 of the FAA
The Arbitration Act of 1698 ("Arbitration Act"), formally called "An Act for
Determining Differences by Arbitration," changed the relationship between courts

preface of Sir Child's book indicates that he wrote the treatise "long before the last session of parliament, that began the 19th of October 1669." Id. at i. This statement suggests two interesting possibilities-Child anticipated that some of his ideas might lead to legislation, and that his advocacy of arbitration may have paved the way for William 11's approval of the arbitration act thirty or more years
after Child published the first edition of his treatise.
81. Id.at 141.
82. Id.at 142.
83. Henry Horwitz & James Oldham, John Locke,Lord Mansfield and Arbitration During the Eighteenth Century, 36 HIST. J. 137, 138 (1993).
84. Id. at 139.
85. Id. at 138.
86. Id. at 142.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 143.
90. Id.
91. Id.at 144.
92. Id.at 142.
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and arbitration. 93 It dealt with two types of arbitration disputes: (1) cases in which
a party wanted to withdraw from an arbitration agreement, or refused to participate in the bargained-for arbitration hearing, and (2) cases where a party challenged the finality of an award, or sought to compel a recalcitrant award-loser to
comply with the arbitrator's ruling.94
By encompassing disputes involving "merchants and traders," the Arbitration
Act adopted a commercial purpose. 95 But the law also applied to other parties
with "controversies," including non-merchants and non-traders. 96 The Arbitration
Act provided a final and binding method to resolve disputes without court interference. 97 To accomplish this purpose, parties entered into an arbitration agreement. 98 They agreed to submit a dispute to one or more persons who were empowered to render an award. 99
Arbitration relied on a royal connection. 00 The arbitration agreement authorized "any of His Majesties Courts of Record which the Parties shall choose" to
enter a rule upon the award. 01' Alternatively, if the parties specified these conditions in a bond that was0 2made part of the arbitration agreement, a court had jurisdiction of the contract.
Importantly, the law dealt severely with a person who failed to submit to arbitration or abide by an award. These parties were subject to a contempt ruling. 3
The Arbitration Act, therefore, used public courts to enforce private arbitration
agreements. 104
By statute, English courts had limited grounds to deny enforcement of an
award, such as when "the Arbitrators or Umpire misbehaved themselves and that
such Award Arbitration or Umpirage was procured by Corruption or other undue
Means. ' 1 5 The law also allowed courts to void awards that were "unduly procured." 106 These terms reappeared when Congress enacted the judicial review
93. William 1I, 1697-8: An Act for Determining Differences by Arbitration, Ch. XV. Rot. Parl. 9
Gul. I. p.3. n.5, reprintedin STATUTES OF THE REALM 1695-1701 (John Raithby ed. 1820),
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (Parties are "obliged to submit to the award... for promoting trade and rendering the awards
of arbitrators the more effectual in all cases for the final determination of controversies referred to
them...").
98. Id. (The law applied to "Merchants and traders & others desiring to end any controversie suit or
quarrel controversies suits or quarrels" who "agree that their Submission of their suit to the award or
umpirage of any person or persons should be made a rule of any of his majesties courts of record
which the parties shall choose, and to insert such their agreement..
99. Id. (referring to submission to "any person or persons").
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (providing alternative methods of embedding the arbitration agreement in "in their Submission or Promise or Condition of their respective Bonds ...
").
103. Id. (stating the arbitration agreement would subject the parties "to all the Penalties of contemning a Rule of Court when hee is a Suitor or Defendant in such Court ...
").
104. Id. (authorizing the Court to "issue processe accordingly which processe shall not be stopt or
delayed in its execution by any order rule co[m]mand or processe of any other court either of law or
Equity...).
105. Id. (allowing for enforcement of the agreement or award to be stopped if "it shall be made appeare on oath to such court that the arbitrators or umpire misbehaved themselves and that such award
arbitration or umpirage was procured by corruption or other undue means").
106. Id. Section I was titled "Arbitration unduly procured, void" and stated:
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standards in the FAA, despite the fact that the original statute provided no guidance as to what, exactly, constituted "misbehavior" or "undue means."
D. English Courts Were Not Hostile to Arbitration
The Arbitration Act fulfilled Josiah Child's and John Locke's vision of using
public law to enforce mercantile arbitration. This accomplishment occurred when
judges implemented the policy preferences of Parliament and William III. This
law lessened the conflicting jurisdictions of arbitrators and judges and put these
neutrals on a more equal footing with each other.
In the following analysis, I contradict the Supreme Court's view that early
English and American courts were hostile to arbitration, despite the fact that some
instances of hostility existed. Some of these courts balked at enforcing arbitration
agreements. Occasionally, they intervened before the arbitration process ran its
full course. Specifically, judges invoked the ouster doctrine, which "allowed a
party to an arbitration to put an end to it at any time before an award was given,
even though his action involved a breach of covenant." 107
But the modem view overestimates this activity. On balance, earlier English
and colonial courts did more to support arbitrations. The current, and erroneous,
view is in the legislative history of the FAA, which traces judicial hostility to a
1746 ruling, Kill v. Hollister.10 8 The English court declared that arbitration
0 9
agreements could not divest a court's jurisdiction.'
But the modem view distorts Kill's influence. The case was nothing more
than a garden-variety insurance decision, written in a single paragraph,l l0 and
rarely cited by other courts in the 1700s. The case did not lay the foundation for a
major judicial doctrine.
More than a century later, an oft-cited decision, Scott v. Avery, revived Kill's
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid that any arbitration or umpirage procured by
corruption or undue means shall be judged and esteemed void and of none effect and accordingly
be sett aside by any court of law or equity so as complaint of such corruption or undue practise be
made in the court where the rule is made for submission to such arbitration or umpirage before
the last day of the next terme after such arbitration or umpirage made and published to the parties
any thing in this act contained to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
107. SIR WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, 14 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 190 (Sweet & Maxwell

1964).
108. Kill v. Hollister, (1746)95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.).
109. Id. Known as the ouster doctrine, the rule said the pre-dispute arbitration agreement in an insurance contract "cannot oust this Court." Id.at 532.
110. To support my contention that Kill's influence is significantly overstated, I reproduce the entire
case inthis short footnote. I call attention to its brevity and narrowness, and its lack of doctrinal elaboration on the so-called ouster doctrine:
This is an action upon a policy of insurance, wherein a clause was inserted, that in case of any
loss or dispute about the policy it should be referred to arbitration; and the plaintiff avers in his
declaration that there has been no reference. Upon the trial at Guildhall the point was reserved for
consideration of the Court, whether this action is well laid before a reference had been [made]?
And by the whole Court-if there had been a reference depending, or made and determined, it
might have been at Bar, but the agreement of the parties cannot oust this Court; and as no reference has been, nor any is depending, the action is well brought, and the plaintiff must have judgment.
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ouster doctrine. I l ' The case involved a strikingly contemporary use of arbitration.
An insurance policy required the policy holder to submit any loss claim to arbitration. 12 On appeal, the court in Avery v. Scott ruled3that an arbitration agreement
could not preclude a court from hearing the matter.'
Crucial to note, but overlooked by the drafters of the FAA's legislative history, the case was reversed on a second appeal." 4 In this key decision, Lord Campbell opposed the ouster doctrine:
[I]s the contract illegal? ...It is contended, that it is contrary to public
policy: that is rather a dangerous ground to go upon .... Can the public

be injured by it? It seems to me that it would be a most inexpedient encroachment upon the liberty of the subject if he were not allowed to enter
into such a contract." 5
Lord Campbell added, "I can see not the slightest ill consequences that can
flow from such an agreement, and I see great advantage that may arise from it.
Public policy, therefore, seems to require that effect should be given to the contract." 116
The point is that English courts did not allow the ouster doctrine to enervate
the Arbitration Act. Wellington v. Mackintosh typified the main approach taken
by eighteenth century courts.11 7 Implicitly rejecting the ouster doctrine, Wellington approvingly stated in dictum: "Persons might certainly
' 1 8 have made such an
agreement as would have ousted this court of jurisdiction."
E. English Courts Deferred to Awards in Applying
the ArbitrationAct of 1698
The Arbitration Act insulated awards from court interference. Judges complied with the law by stating deferential principles for reviewing disputed awards.
Lord Mansfield set this pattern in the much-cited 1757 case, Hawkins v. Colclough, when he declared:
Awards are now considered with greater latitude and less strictness than
they were formerly. And it is right that they should be liberally con111. The two initial Scott v. Avery decisions are found in Scott v. Avery, (1853) 155 Eng. Rep. 1442
(Exch. Ct.) ("Scott F'); and Avery v. Scott, (1853) 155 Eng. Rep. 1447 (Exch. Ct.) ("Scott IF'). After
the Exchequer ruled for the plaintiff in Scott 1,that judgment was overturned in Scott I on a writ of
error in the Exchequer Chamber.
112. Scott 11,
155 Eng. Rep. at 1448.
113. Id. Lord Coleridge declared: "[I]t is conceded that any agreement which is to prevent the suffering party from coming into a Court of law, or, in other words, which ousts the Courts of their jurisdiction, cannot be supported." Id.
114. Scott v. Avery, (1856) 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (H.L.), ("Scott III") (wherein the House of Lords
affirmed Scott I1,
but on different grounds). Ultimately, the House of Lords did not support Lord Coleridge's view of the ouster doctrine. Id. at 1137-39. However, they did not explicitly reject the doctrine.
Id.
115. Id. at 1138.
116. Id.
117. (1743) 26 Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch.).
118. Id.
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strued; because they are made by Judges of the parties own choosing.
And this is often. .. in cases of small consequence, where the play is not
worth the candle.119
But arbitration was not just for small claims. Arbitrators decided large controversies and occasionally ordered parties to pay damages that the disputants
believed were beyond their means. Courts backed these arbitrations, using contempt powers to enforce an award that required monetary payment by a recalcitrant party.
Take the dramatic case of an unnamed losing party who, after refusing to pay
on an arbitration award, was imprisoned for his non-compliance. The Burrows'
Worcester Journalreported a tense exchange between the prisoner and Lord Chief
Justice Mansfield in the Court of the King's Bench on November 9, 1770:
A prisoner in the King's Bench came into the court ... and begged his
Lordship to read the copy of his commitment, explain it to him, and point
out what Authority the court had to deprive him of his liberty: his copy of
causes being read, it appeared to be an attachment against the body, for
the nonperformance of an arbitration bond, which the court calls a supposed contempt of court. The prisoner observed, if he had been guilty of
any contempt, he looked on himself bound by the laws of this free country, to pay implicit obedience; but if a thing imaginary, he hoped it was
not sufficient to deprive a Briton of his Liberty... to this the court20said,
You have been ordered to pay a sum of money, and you must do it.'
This severe approach was not an isolated application of the Arbitration Act.
A published case from 1797, Hicks v. Richardson, showed that courts were willing to issue personal attachments against individuals who refused to comply with
awards in arbitration bonds.12' This was an extreme measure because the attachment meant imprisonment for the recalcitrant party without any judicial process to
challenge the award. Freedom came by complying with the award.
It is hard to imagine greater judicial deference to arbitration. To illustrate,
Richardson paid the arbitrator's entire expenses and then sued on the award in
order to recover Hicks' share of the arbitrator's costs. 122 Hicks objected, contending that Richardson could not reach beyond the express terms of the awardwhich called for an equal division of costs. 23 Hicks contended that Richardson
could not seek reimbursement by petitioning a court to imprison Hicks until he
paid for his share of the arbitrator's fee.' 24 Chief Justice Eyre had no sympathy
for Mr. Hicks' literal argument, stating:
119. Hawkins v. Colclough, (1757) 97 Eng. Rep. 311, 312 (K.B.).
120. John Brewer, The Wilkites and the Law, 1763-64: A Study of Radical Notions of Governance, in
AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE: THE ENGLISH & THEIR LAw IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH

CENTURIES at 168-69 (John Brewer & John Styles eds., Rutgers U. Press 1980), quoting BuRRows'
WORCESTER JOURNAL (Nov. 15 1770); see also Horwitz & Oldham, supra note 83, at 137.
121. Hicks v. Richardson, (1796) 126 Eng. Rep. 796.
122. Id. at 796.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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[I]f we are satisfied that the Plaintiff has refused to pay his moiety of the
costs ...[s]hall we oblige the arbitrator to bring an action? ...I cannot
but think that it was the better course to be taken in this case, for the arbitrator to get the whole costs from the Defendant by withholding the
award, who may redress himself by one attachment, than for the Defendant to have an attachment against the Plaintiff for not obeying the award
as far as concerned him, and then for the arbitrator to have an attachment
against him, for the moiety of the costs of the arbitration. What a scene
of litigation, expence and vexation25might this strictness produce? ... I
think the attachment should issue. 1
Despite the aforementioned cases, courts rarely found it necessary to imprison
people for failing to comply with an award. By the turn of the nineteenth century,
arbitration was an entrenched institution, and English case law on arbitration proliferated. The clearest picture on judicial review of awards appears in leading
treatises of the period. These commentaries-running from the mid-1700s to
early 1800s-show that English and American colonial courts were neither hostile
nor blindly deferential to arbitration. They steered a moderate course of reasonable deference to awards.
Courts intervened when arbitrators made unreasonable use of their powers.
An award could not reserve an issue for future disposition.126 Nor could arbitrators "reserve to themselves the power of altering the whole, or part of the
award,"' 127 or compel an impossible action.'2 8 An award had 3to be "certain and
definite,"' 129 and could not go beyond the submission of issues.' 0
Still, courts would not inquire into the merits of an award, believing that "the
arbitrator is a judge, from whose sentence there is no appeal, and that no other
tribunal can inquire into the equity of his decision."' 3' Stewart Kyd, in his seminal work, A Treatise on the Law of Awards, explained: 'The submission by the
litigating parties, to the decision of an individual, arises from the confidence
which they repose in his integrity and skill, and is merely personal to him...
Essentially, English law borrowed from an ancient Roman view, stating that
"a person cannot be an arbitrator, who, by nature or accident, has not discretion." 133 When disputants chose an arbitrator, the law respected this selection:
"Everyone whom the law supposes capable of judging, whatever may be his character for integrity or wisdom, may be an arbitrator or umpire; because he is appointed by the choice
of the parties themselves, and it is their folly to choose an
'' 34
improper person.
Blackstone's Commentaries observed that courts embraced arbitration for its
125. Id. at 796-97.
126. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 107, at 191.
127. STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AWARDS, (William P. Farrand & Co., 2d ed. 1808
(1799).
128. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 107, at 192.
129. KYD, supranote 127, at 124.
130. Id. at 145-46.
131. Id. at 147.
132. Id. at 127.
133. Id. at 147.
134. Id.
at 70.
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power to redress personal wrongs.' 35 He noted the "great use of these peaceable
and domestic tribunals, especially in settling matters of account, and other mercantile transactions, which are difficult and almost impossible to be adjusted on a
trial at law." 36 But awards could "be set aside for corruption or other misbehaviour in the arbitrators or umpire."' 37 Blackstone also noted that "it is now beof superior courts, to set aside such
come a considerable part of the business
' 138
awards when partially or illegally made."
By the early 1800s, a large body of common law rulings on arbitration awards
had accumulated. The rudiments of the FAA's reviewing standards are most
clearly revealed in Joseph Chitty's volume, A Treatise on the Law of Commerce. 39 When courts vacated awards, they did so in extreme circumstances
where arbitrators violated a party's trust, such as when arbitrators were "partial
and unjust, or had mistaken the law." 4° The same result occurred when arbitration was procured by corruption or undue means; or the award did not follow the
submission, or was too extensive or too limited; or the arbitrator exceeded his
authority, or had no authority to make the award; or the arbitrator's authority was
revoked.14' An award was not confirmed if it had procedural "irregularity, as
want of notice of the meeting," or was produced by "collusion or misbehavior of
the arbitrators."142
In sum, arbitration received greater acceptance as a dispute resolution method
from 1698 through the early 1800s. Statutes authorized courts to enforce promises to submit disputes to arbitration and to confirm awards that were not accepted
by a losing party. Many common law doctrines were built on the statute's premise that arbitration should function as an autonomous process, unless abuses
create some injustice. This research is relevant because it reveals the original
sources of judicial review standards that eventually appeared in the FAA.'43
I conclude this section by noting that my research disclosed evidence that
contradicts my thesis, that early arbitrations involved only commercial rights that
were defined by contract or the common law. A few courts did, in fact, review
statutory arbitrations. The evidence appears in the 1846 publication of Bacon's
Abridgement. 44 Bacon reported that courts enforced arbitrator rulings even when
the awards conflicted with the law: "[I]f the parties choose to refer a distinct question of law, and nothing else, to the decision of an arbitrator instead of the court,
his award, though not agreeable to the law, cannot be impeached.' ' 145 Bacon noted
that arbitrators could decide issues of statutory law, and "[w]here the submission
was in pursuance of an act of the legislature, it was held that the award could not
135. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS, 15
(George Sharswood ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1908).
136. Id. at 16.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. JOSEPH CHITTY, TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF COMMERCE AND MANUFACTURES AND THE
CONTRACTS RELATING THERETO (Vol. H A. Strahan 1824).
140. Id. at 665.
141. Id. at 665-66.
142. Id. at 666.

143. See An Act for DeterminingDifferences by Arbitration, supra note 93.
144. Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law with Large Additions and Corrections (Vol. I
Henry Gyillim & Charles E. Dodd eds., Thomas Davis 1846) (1801).
145. Id. at 363.
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be impeached, unless the arbitrators had exceeded their powers or executed them
imperfectly."' 146
But this phenomenon was rare. And when some colonial courts reviewed statutory awards, some of them overturned the arbitrator's ruling. 47 Important to
add, the cases did not report that the arbitration agreement was imposed on one of
the parties, as is the case in contemporary forms of mandatory arbitration.

F. U.S. Courts Followed the EnglishApproach of Confirming
ArbitrationAwards
Throughout the nineteenth century, American courts closely followed the
English approach to arbitration, by generally favoring arbitration.,48 Judges admired its simple procedures and efficiency. 49 When courts referred disputes to
arbitration, their jurisdiction ended. 150 Rulings supported arbitrations after the
process ran its full course and ended with an award. Thus, courts enforced arbitration agreements where the parties consented to judicial enforcement of the
award.' 5 1 Seeing practical utility in arbitration, 152 judges ruled that they had authority to enforce arbitrator rulings153---even erroneous ones.' 54 When awards
155
were partially defective, courts enforced the valid part of the arbitrator's award.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 364. Bacon also observed: "Where, however, it appears on the face of the award that the
arbitrator has decided contrary to the law, the courts are bound to take notice of the objection, and to
set aside the award." Id.
148. Neely v. Buford, 65 Mo. 448, 451 (1877) ("Courts are disposed to regard with favor these tribunals of the parties' own selection").
149. See Brush v. Fisher, 38 N.W. 446, 448 (Mich. 1888); Campbell v. Western, 3 Paige Ch. 124, 138
(N.Y. Ch. 1832):
If every party who arbitrates, in relation to a contested claim, to save trouble and expense, is to be
subjected to a chancery suit, and to several hundred dollars cost, if the arbitrators happen to err
upon a doubtful question as to the admissibility of a witness, the sooner these domestic tribunals
of the parties' own selection are abolished, the better. Such a principle is wholly inconsistent with
common sense, and cannot be the law of a court of equity.
150. McKim v. Thompson, 1 Bland's Ch. Rep. 150, 175 (Md. 1827) ("By referring a case to arbitration, the court divests itself of its judicial power").
151. Hughes v. Bywater, 4 Hill 551, 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843):
[Tlhe stipulation in this instrument of submission [to arbitration] is the same thing as if it had expressly authorized the entry of judgment by an attorney. It is virtually saying to the plaintiff, 'if
the award be against me, I waive my right to insist on a special motion'... An agreement to arbitrate discontinues a cause.
152. Garitee v. Carter, 16 Md. 309, 309 (1860) ("[a] more liberal and reasonable interpretation of
awards is now adopted by the courts than formerly existed; every reasonable intendment will be made
in their favor, and a construction given to them that will support them, if possible ... ").
153. Green v. Patchin, 13 Wend. 293, 295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) ("Where a judgment has been entered
according to the written agreement of the parties, without fraud, the court will permit the parties to
enforce it, and will not interfere to set it aside, or examine its merits"). See also Farrington v. Hamblin,
12 Wend. 212, 213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) ("The arbitrators were not officers of the court, but judges of
the parties' own choosing. The court had no control over them; and but for the stipulation to enter
judgment, the court would not entertain any motion in relation to the subject") (internal citations omitted)).
154. Winship v. Jewett, 1 Barb. Ch. 173, 179 (N.Y. Ch. 1845) ("An award made in good faith, although erroneous, is conclusive. The dissent of one of the arbitrators subsequently to an award regularly made will not invalidate it").
155. Brown v. Warnock, 5 Dana 492, 493 (Ky. 1837) (stating that an award may be good in part, and
void in part).
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Courts rejected revocations after an award was rendered.15 6 In confirming
awards, they used more deferential standards than appellate courts used to review
trial rulings.15 7 Thus, awards were usually treated as final and binding.1 58 Arbitrators could not withdraw their rulings. 159 Where only two out of three arbitrators
signed an award, courts enforced the ruling.' 60 If parties authorized a panel of
arbitrators to rule on their dispute, withdrawal by one arbitrator did not deprive the
remaining arbitrators of authority to render an enforceable award.' 61 In one case,
a court enforced an award after it was amended to include payment of forum
costs. 1 62 In short, these nineteenth century cases show that American courts were
highly deferential when they reviewed disputed awards.

156. Rogers' Heirs v. Nall, 25 Tenn. 29, 30 ( 1845):
But in this case the award was made and published to the parties before any attempt was made to
revoke the authority of the arbitrators. It is manifestly absurd to assume that an authority already
exercised can be countermanded. The attempt to revoke the submission in this case, therefore,
comes too late.
See also McGheehen v. Duffield, 5 Pa. 497, 498 (1847) ("[T]he umpire had heard the parties and made
his award before the defendants [sic] act of revocation. They were too late, as a submission cannot be
revoked after award...").
157. Wilson v. Williams, 66 Barb. 209, 210 (N.Y. 1870) ("An agreement to arbitrate a pending suit
operates as a discontinuance of the suit as an action; but nevertheless if the agreement provides for a
judgment to be entered in the action, such judgment may be entered, and stand as a judgment by consent, which cannot be set aside in the ordinaryway by which errorsare corrected.")(emphasis added).
158. Tankersley v. Richardson, 2 Stew. 130 (Ala. 1829):
The adjustment of [c]ontroversies and suits by arbitration, is a species of remedy much favored
by legislation; so much so, that, not only what can be, is intended in its favor, but it will not be
permitted to be impugned for any extrinsic cause; unless it be founded in corruption, partiality, or
other undue means.
159. Patton v. Baird, 7 Ired. Eq. 255, 259 (N.C. 1851) ("After an award is made, the arbitrators are
'functi officio,' and have no more power to alter it, than a jury have to change their verdict, after [sic] it
is rendered, and they[ are] discharged").
160. Campbell v. Western, 3 Paige Ch. 124, 138 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) ( "Submission to the arbitration of
three or any two, two join in the award giving notice of the award concluded, and being about to be
returned to the third, who does not join in it; held, that this is no objection to the validity of the
award").
161. Kile v. Chapin, 9 Ind. 150 (Ind. 1857) ("Even when several arbitrators are appointed by the
parties, and one refuses to act, the award of the other arbitrators will be valid. For the law will not put
it in the power of one arbitrator to defeat the submission by withdrawing from the trust").
162. Dudley v. Thomas, 23 Cal. 365, 367 (Cal 1863). ("The arbitrators have power to award costs,
though no mention be made of costs in the submission, as it is a matter within the terms of a general
reference"). In Dudley, the appellant contended that the arbitrators amended the award by billing costs
of the arbitration. Id. at 367. A common-law rule provided that after an award was made and delivered,
the arbitrators could not alter it, even to correct mistakes. Id. at 368. But the Dudley court distinguished the award of costs, reasoning: "We are satisfied that the execution of this subsequent instrument did not vitiate the original award, which remained unaltered by the arbitrators." Id.
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTORY ARBITRATIONS: FEDERAL COURTS
SHOULD EQUALLY VACATE ARBITRATION AWARDS AND REVERSE TRIAL

COURT JUDGMENTS

A. Should FederalCourts Equally Vacate Statutory ArbitrationAwards
and Reverse Civil CourtJudgment? Gilmer Forum Substitution Theory
Answers "Yes"
In this section, I explain how the historical relationship between courts and
arbitrations can be put to an empirical test. My thesis is that the FAA's extreme
deference to arbitration awards evolved from common law arbitrations that were
protected from court interference by William III and the Arbitration Act
I contend, however, that Gilmer created a new form of adjudication when it
approved mandatory arbitration of statutory rights. Congress--not the contracting
parties--created these rights, and Congress intended that these rights would be
enforced by Article III courts, not citizen arbitrators. This new form of arbitration--statutory arbitration-does not warrant the FAA's unusually strong deference. Furthermore, I contend that Gilmer's theory of forum substitution means
that federal courts should vacate arbitration awards and court judgments at equal
rates.
Recall that Robert Gilmer was employed as a financial services manager, and
as such, his employer required him to sign an agreement referring any future dispute he might have in connection with his work to arbitration. 63 Later, after he
was terminated, he challenged his mandatory arbitration agreement.164 He argued,
for example, that the arbitration procedures were inferior to the judicial processes
afforded to him under the ADEA. 165 The Supreme Court broadly rejected Gilmer' s contention. 166
Gilmer argued that Congress intended for the ADEA not only "to address individual grievances, but also to further important social policies."' 167 The majority
opinion dismissed this concern, finding no conflict in the ADEA's prohibition of
age discrimination and the FAA's public policy that favors arbitration of disputes.1 8 Equating arbitrations to trials, the Court reasoned: "It is true that arbitration focuses on specific disputes between the parties involved. The same can be
said, however, of judicial resolution of claims. Both of these dispute resolution
mechanisms nevertheless also can further broader social purposes."' 169 The Court
added that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or
her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to
170
serve both its remedial and deterrent function."'
Gilmer challenged a variety of arbitration procedures, viewing them as inade163. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 27.
166. Id. at 28-29.
167. Id. at 27.
168. Id. at 27-28.
169. Id. at 28.
170. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chlysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985)).
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quate to enforce rights under the ADEA. 17 ' Broadly dismissing this idea, the
Court reasoned that "generalized attacks on arbitration 'rest[] on suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive
law to would-be complainants."" 72 The majority rejected Gilmer's arguments
that arbitration panels would be biased 173 and that discovery in arbitration would
be less fruitful for complainants compared to trials. 174
Also, Gilmer contended that because securities arbitrators do not issue written
opinions, he was deprived of an effective appellate review. 7 5 The Court sides-76
tepped this argument, noting that NYSE arbitrations required a written decision. 1
This point neglected to address the fact that many securities arbitration awards,
although written, are cursory and state no rationale for the ruling. Finally, Gilmer
challenged the narrower scope of review of an arbitration award as compared to a
court judgment. 7778 But the majority relegated this issue to a small footnote, in a
feeble rejection.1

In sum, the Gilmer majority did not expressly rule on award-reviewing standards in the FAA. Nonetheless, the opinion made sweeping assumptions that
equated, for example, arbitration of an age discrimination claim with different
kinds of arbitration-for example, arbitration of a commercial contract claim,
where both parties are corporations who may have bargained for arbitration in an
arm's length negotiation. Gilmer, however, treated these contextual differences as
insignificant. By this logic, judicial review should be the same for statutory
claims asserted by an employee (even if the individual possessed no bargaining
power over the arbitration procedure) and contractual claims asserted by a large
corporation (even if the company had substantive input in defining the process to
suit its interests).
B. Should Federal Courts Equally Vacate Statutory ArbitrationAwards
and Reverse Civil Court Judgments? FAA 's Text and Legislative History
Answer "No"
If arbitration is a pure substitute for litigation, federal courts should vacate arbitration awards and reverse trial judgments in equal measure. Nonetheless, it
seems that courts treat awards with greater deference than trial rulings. In anticipation of this result, I now consider an alternative theory to explain why federal
courts would defer more to arbitrator rulings than judicial rulings made on the
same claims.

171. Id. at 28-34.
172. Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989)).
173. Id. at 30-31.
174. Id. at 31-32.
175. Id. at 31-32.
176. Id. at 32.
177. Id. at 32, n.4
178. id. The majority concluded: "We have stated, however, that 'although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute' at issue." Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 232 (1987)).
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When Congress enacted the FAA in 1925,179 lawmakers wanted to help businesses reduce expense and delay in resolving legal disputes.
Echoing the rationale for the Arbitration Act of 1698, business leaders in the 1920s contended that
lawsuits led to "ruinous litigation."1'8 They told Congress that consumer prices
rose because of the high cost of litigation.' 8 2 Arbitration helped, however, to reduce these costs by minimizing
judicial interference in the business' private at8
tempts to settle their disputes.'
A leading proponent of the FAA, Charles L. Bernheimer, explained to lawmakers that he had studied arbitration since the panic of 1907,' 84 and found that
s5
the merchants' problems could have been abated by greater use of arbitration.'
In another historical parallel, businesses in the 1920s echoed English merchant
complaints that courts enabled parties to break their promises to arbitrate.186
In addition, a leading commercial lawyer who advocated passage of the FAA
before Congress, Julius Henry Cohen believed that courts had been hostile to arbitration for 300 years. While the Supreme Court did not expressly mention Cohen
in Gilmer, it clearly picked up his recurring theme, from FAA testimony, about
judicial hostility to arbitration There are interesting parallels between Julius Henry Cohen's and John Locke's rationales for legislating judicial enforcement of
arbitration agreements. Recall that Locke helped to draft the Arbitration Act of
1698, in a role like Cohen's. Locke came into this role after observing that courts
179. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§
1-16 (2000), renamed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1947. See Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, § 1, 43
Stat. 883, amended by Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669.
180. S.REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (stating that the FAA was proposed to help businesses avoid "the delay
and expenses of litigation"); and H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (showing that Congress believed the simplicity of arbitration would "reduc[e] technicality, delay, and [keep] expense to a minimum and at the
same time safeguard the rights of the parties").
181. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearingson S.1005 and H.R. 656 before
the Subcommittee of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 1st Sess, on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, at
6 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (Statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman of Committee
on Arbitration).
182. Id. at 7 (observing that "[t]he litigant's expenses- that is, whatever is necessary to cover the
annual outlay for litigation or the fear of litigation, consultations with lawyers, the possibility of cancellations, and so forth, eventually creeps into the selling price as well").
183. Id. at 31 (Statement of Wilson J. Vance, Secretary of New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce:
"[t]here are very few cases that have actually come to trial in the arbitration tribunals ... [because]
business men have adopted the practice of getting together and settling their business differences").
184. Id. Bernheimer stated:
I have made a study of the question of arbitration ever since the panic of 1907. The difficulties
merchants then met with, that of having repudiations and other business troubles, resulting in
much loss and expense outside of the costly and ruinous litigation, caused me to start on a study
of the subject of arbitration, and the deeper I got into it the more I was convinced we should have
legislation in State and Nation that would make arbitration a reality, that would cause an agreement or contract in writing providing for arbitration to be binding upon the parties and an irrevocable proposition.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 14. Congress was persuaded by Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel of the New York
State Chamber of Commerce, who testified:
The difficulty is that men do enter into these such [arbitration] agreements and then afterwards
repudiate the agreement.... You go in and watch the expression on the face of your arbitrator
and you have a 'hunch' that he is against you, and you withdraw and say, 'I do not believe in arbitration anymore.'
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allowed parties who lost in arbitration to renege on their promises to treat the arbitrators' rulings as final and binding.187 Locke and Cohen believed that public
authority was needed to make arbitration more effective. 188
My historical study casts serious doubt on Cohen's blanket condemnation.
Indeed, if courts were so hostile to arbitration, how did arbitration manage to survive? But that is beside the more important point: the Court never questioned
Cohen's belief that courts were hostile to arbitration.
Compare the following Supreme Court assessments of this relationship with
the historical evidence I presented in Part III (supra). In Gilmer, the Court said
that the FAA was enacted "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by
American courts."' 89 In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the Court stated that
when Congress passed the FAA, it was "motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire"' 190 to reverse long-standing judicial resistance to arbitration.
The Court made the same point in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 191
More recently, Gilmer repeated these historical distortions, stating that the
FAA's "purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by
American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts."' 92 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court repeated this
idea, stating that "the FAA was a response to hostility of American courts to the
a judicial disposition inherited from thenenforcement of arbitration agreements,
'
longstanding English practice. 193
In short, the FAA was built on a flawed understanding of the historical relationship between courts and arbitration. Still, when the Sixty-Eighth Congress
passed the original FAA, and Parliament passed the Arbitration Act, they had
similar intentions: to strengthen the autonomy of arbitration as a means for promoting the economic interests of businesses, merchants, and traders.
The evidence I present below shows that the FAA is a direct descendent of
the Arbitration Act, a law that was designed for commercial parties who wanted
to use arbitration as an effective alternative to courts. I summarize this evidence
in Chart A. The chart compares the text of the Arbitration Act of 1698 and the
FAA. When the text is placed side by side, the legislative ancestry is clear. The
terms trade, merchants, and maritime are highlighted because these words show
that English and American lawmakers enacted arbitration laws specifically to
benefit these sectors of the economy. Arbitration laws were designed to provide
187. Horwitz & Oldham, supra note 83, at 138.
188. Cohen's advocacy was likely shaped by his earlier scholarship. Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of
Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 YALE L. J. 147, 147 (1921) ("For over three
hundred years, a dictum of Lord Coke has held sway over the minds of America. It is now on its fair
way to a decent burial").
189. Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
190. 470 U.S. 213, 219-20, 220 n.6 (1985).
191. 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974), observing:
English courts traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as 'ousting' the courts
of jurisdiction, and refused to enforce such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted by
American courts as part of the common law up to the time of the adoption of the Arbitration Act.
192. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
193. 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001).
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sophisticated industry tribunals great latitude in working out problems among
commercial peers, with little interference from judges who were generally ignorant of business practices.
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Chart A: Enforcing Arbitration Agreements
Comparing the Commercial Scope of the 1698 Arbitration Act
and Federal1 9 4Arbitration Act of 1925
1KO2 A..-h~frnn A~t
1409 A

hif

H

A

# 194

Section 1: Recital that References made by Rule
of Court have contributed to the Ease of the
Subject
Merchants, &c., where Remedy only by Personal
Action or Suit in Equity, may agree that Award
may be made a Rule of Court, and may insert the
same in their Submission. Whereas it hath been
found by Experience That References made by
Rule of Court have contributed much to the Ease of
the Subject in the determining of Controversies
because the Parties become thereby obliged to
submitt to the Award of the Arbitrators under the
Penalty of Imprisonment for their Contempt in case
they refuse Submission Now for promoting Tra40
and rendring the Awards of Arbitrators the more
effectual in all Cases for the final Determination of
Controversies referred to them. Merchan s and
Traders or others concerning Matters of Account
or Trade or other Matters Be it enacted . . . t
shall and may be lawfull for_ aU Merchants and
Traders & others desiring to end any Controversie
Suit or Quarrel Controversies Suits or Quarrels ...
by Arbitration to agree that their Submission of
their Suit to the Award or Umpirage of any person
or persons should be made a Rule of any of His
Majesties Courts of Record which the Parties shall
choose and to insert such their Agreement in their
Submission or the Condition of the Bond or
Promise whereby they oblidge themselves
respectively to submitt to the Award or Umpirage
of any Person or Persons which Agreement being
so made and inserted in their Submission or
Promise or Condition of their respective Bonds
shall or may upon producing an Affidavit thereof
made by the Witnesses thereunto or any one of
them in the Court of which the same is agreed to be
made a Rule & reading and filing the said
Affidavitt in Court be entred of Record in such
Court and a Rule shall thereupon be made by the
said Court that the Parties shall submitt to & finally
be concluded by the Arbitration or Umpirage
which shall be made concerning them by the
Arbitrators or Umpire pursuant to such Submission

lllrAl Awhit-ti..

A,# 19zp

Section 2. Validity,
irrevocability, and
enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate
A written provision in any
maritime transaction or d
contract evidencing a
transaction involving
commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.

194. An Act for DeterminingDifferences by Arbitration,supra note 93.
195. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

29

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2009, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION

(Vol. 2009

While Chart A compares how the English and American arbitration statutes
similarly enforced promises to arbitrate disputes, Chart B (infra) traces the origins
of FAA judicial review standards to English statutory and common law sources.
While Congress was mostly concerned with enforcing arbitration agreements,196 it
gave little thought to standards for vacating an award. 197 The 1924 Senate report
stated that the award could be set aside: where it was secured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means; or if there was partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators; or in a situation where an arbitrator was guilty of misconduct or refused to
hear evidence; or because of prejudicial misbehavior by the parties; or because the
arbitrator exceeded his or her powers.'98 The Senate merely included a lengthy
excerpt from a lawyer's brief to express its intent that an award should be enforced absent any of the aforementioned exceptions.' 99 Section 10 codified these
grounds to vacate an award.2 °°
Chart B provides clear evidence of the origins of key judicial review standards in Section 10 of the FAA. The chart links the FAA standards to such disparate sources as the Arbitration Act of 1698 and common law treatises by Blackstone, Chitty, and Kyd. Chart B shows, in the emphasized expressions, that Section 10(1) of the FAA took nearly verbatim reproductions of these early statutory
and common law sources.

196. Joint Hearings, supra note 181 (statement of Bernheimer). The House Report stated: "The
purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts

involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction o[f] admiralty, or which may be the subject of
litigation in the Federal courts." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924).
197. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924). The 1924 House report stated: "The award

may then be entered as a judgment, subject to attack by the other party for fraud and corruption and
similar undue influence, or for palpable error in form." Id. at 2.
198. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
199. JointHearings, supra note 181, at 36 (statement of W.W. Nichols):
The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the arbitrators unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common morality, it ought not to be enforced. This

exists only when corruption, partiality, fraud or misconduct are present or when the arbitrators
exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers or were influenced by other undue means- cases
in which enforcement would obviously be unjust. There is no authority and no opportunity for

the court, in connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should have
been.
200. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000), authorizing courts to vacate an award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
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Chart B: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
Comparing English Law (Late 1600s-Early 1800s) and
Federal ArbitrationAct (1925) Standards for Reviewin2 Awards
Federal Arhitratinn Act
Enlish Common Law (Late 1700s-Early 1800s)
Federal Arbitration Act
Arbitration Act of 1698
Section 10 authorizes courts
Section 1: Recital that References made by Rule to vacate an award:
of Court have contributed to the Ease of the
Subject
(1) where the award was
...And in case of Disobedience to such Arbitration procured by
corruption,
or Umpirage the Party neglecting or refusing to fraud, or undue means;
performe and execute the same or any part thereof
shall be subject to all the Penalties of contemning a (2) where there was evident
Rule of Court when hee is a Suitor or Defendant in partiality or corruption by the
such Court and the Court on Motion shall issue arbitrators;
Processe accordingly which Processe shall not be
stopt or delayed in its Execution by any Order Rule (3) where the arbitrators were
Co[m]mand or Processe of any other Court either of guilty of misconduct in
Law or Equity unlesse it shall be made appeare on refusing to postpone the
Oath to such Court that the Arbitrators or Umpire hearing, upon sufficient cause
misbehaved themselves and that such Award
shown, or in refusing to hear
Arbitration or Umpirage was procured by
evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or of any
Corruption or other undue Means.
other misbehavior by which
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
the rights of any party have
LAWS OF ENGLAND: INFOUR BOOKS (IH) (George been prejudiced; or
Sharswood, ed. 1908)
(4) where the arbitrators
Awards could "be set aside for corruption or other exceeded their powers, or so
misbehaviour in the arbitrators or umpire."
imperfectly y .xecuted them
that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject
JOSEPH CHITrY, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF
COMMERCE AND MANUFACTURES (fiX, 1824)
matter submitted was not
made.
Courts denied enforcement to awards when
arbitrators were "partialand unjust, or had mistaken
the law," or the award did "not follow the
submission, or (was) too extensive or too limited,"
or "the arbitrator has exceeded his. authority, or
had no authority to make the award, or that his
authority was revoked," or there was procedural
"irregularity, as want of notice of the meeting," or
the award was flawed due to "collusion, or
misbehaviour of the arbitrators."
STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

AWARDS (1808)
Kyd: "it was held that the award could not be
impeached, unless the arbitrators had exceeded their
powers or executed them imperfectly."
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V. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

A. Methodfor Creatingthe Sample
In general terms, my research strategy is to combine historical research about
arbitration with empirical analysis of current arbitration trends. For the quantitative element of my research, I used research methods from my earlier empirical
studies. 20 1 I derived the sample in my study from Westlaw's internet service. I
searched both federal and state Westlaw databases for cases because employers
and individuals are allowed a choice of forum to contest awards. I used keywords
derived from terms in the FAA, RUAA, and state arbitration laws.2 °2
I limited the search to arbitrations involving an individual and employer.
Each case I selected for analysis involved a post-award dispute in which an arbitrator's ruling was challenged by either an employee or employer. In addition, I
excluded arbitration cases involving unions and employers because they involve
unique characteristics of labor-management relations.20 3
The sample began with a 1975 decision2 0 and ended with cases from February 2008. After a potential case was identified, I read it to see if it met the inclusion criteria. For example, pre-arbitration disputes over enforcement of an arbitration clause were excluded. On the other hand, I included cases where employees
resisted arbitration, were compelled to arbitrate their claims, and were later involved in a post-award lawsuit.20 5 Some cases involved employees who preferred
court to arbitration
but prevailed in the private forum, leading the employer to
20 6
seek vacatur.
Once a case met the criteria, I checked it against a roster to avoid duplication 207 and recorded the relevant data. Next, I coded data about: (1) the party who
won the award, (2) the court, whether it was state or federal, (3) the first court
ruling on motion to confirm or vacate an award, and (4) the appellate ruling,
where appropriate. Other data (for example, the tendency of arbitrators to rule for
201. E.g., Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As the Enterprise Wheel Turns: New Evidence on the
Finality of Labor Arbitration Awards, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 191,202-03 (2007). See also Michael
H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Reinventing the Enterprise Wheel: Court Review of Punitive Awards in
Labor and Employment Arbitrations, 11 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 199, 230-34 (2006); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy of Workplace
Arbitration Systems, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSp. RES. 19,45-48 (2001).
202. E.g., "procured by corruption," or "evident partiality," or "refusing to postpone the hearing," or
"arbitrators exceeded their powers," or "imperfectly executed."
203. See United Steelworkers of America. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., which stated, the arbitrator "is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are
obliged to accept.... He is rather part of a system of self-government created by and confined to the
parties." 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
204. McClure v. Montgomery County Community Action Agency, 1975 WL 181652 (Ohio Ct. App.
1975).
205. E.g., Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2004).
206. In Madden v. Kidder Peabody & Co., an employee sued but was ordered by the court to arbitrate
his claim. 883 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994). After he prevailed and was awarded $250,000,
the employer sued to vacate the award, but the court denied the motion. Id.
207. In rare cases, an award was challenged once and remanded to arbitration; and after arbitrators
ruled again, the award was challenged a second time. I treated these award challenges as separate
cases, even though the parties and dispute remained the same, because the awards differed. See Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2003).
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employers or employees, and the probability that courts would vacate wins for a
company or for an individual), were analyzed for companion studies.2 °8
The data sheet contained a long list of grounds for a party to challenge an
award. There were four FAA options under Section 10 of that law. State Uniform
Arbitration Acts repeated the FAA options, and in some jurisdictions, these laws
added a fifth standard. I coded these separately from the FAA because they were
state laws. Sometimes awards were also reviewed by using common law standards. Allowing for these possibilities, my list of grounds for a party to challenge
an award consisted of five Trilogy standards and five separate federal common
law standards. 209 The list also included miscellaneous grounds for punitive
awards, awards with excessive remedies, and unconstitutional awards.
B. Empirical Results
My database consisted of 291 arbitration awards that involved a legal claim
asserted by an employee or employer. At the conclusion of these arbitrations, one
or both parties challenged the award. As a result, 170 federal district courts and
121 first-level state courts made a ruling to enforce, partially enforce, or vacate
the arbitration award. In 90 federal cases, and 102 state cases, appellate courts
ruled on these lower court judgments-again, enforcing, partially enforcing, or
vacating the awards. Altogether, the database had 483 court rulings that reviewed
disputed employment arbitration awards.
This study also reports comparable data from federal courts. These statistics
show how often appellate courts reverse trial courts-a type of decision that is
akin to court review of an arbitrator's ruling on the evidence. Thus, Table 1 compares two federal court metrics. The data in Rows 1-4 come from my database.
Row 5 shows data from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.21° Both data
sources measure how often a federal court overturns a lower tribunal's ruling.211
208. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale
Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 167, 205 (2008) (reporting on a recent spurt of award-review cases,
exemplified by the finding that 62 percent of federal district award-review courts decisions occurred
since 2000). See also Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by Statute:
Empirical Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 551 (2008) (concluding
that states are expanding arbitration reviewing standard)..
209. In rank order of their frequency, the issues were: (1) Manifest Disregard of the Law (Non-Trilogy
Common Law Standard); (2) Exceed Powers or Imperfectly Execute Award (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)
(2006) or State UAA Equivalent); (3) Partiality (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) or State UAA Equivalent); (4)
Award Violated a Public Policy (Trilogy Common Law); (5) Misconduct (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) or State
UAA Equivalent); (6) Lacks Jurisdiction Due to Timeliness Requirements (9 U.S.C. § 12 or State
Equivalent); (7) Arbitrator Committed A Fact-Finding Error (Trilogy Common Law); (8) Arbitrary &
Capricious, Irrational, or Gross Error (Non-Trilogy Common Law Standard); (9) Arbitrator Exceeded
Authority ( Trilogy Common Law); (10) Award Procured by Corruption, Fraud, or Undue Means (9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(l) or State UAA Equivalent); (11) Award Did Not Draw Its Essence from the Agreement (Trilogy Common Law); (12) Remedy Was Punitive, Excessive, or Unauthorized (Non-Trilogy
Common Law Standard); and (13) Unconstitutional or Due Process (Non-Trilogy Common Law
Standard).
210. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Table B-5, U.S. Courts of Appeals-Appeals Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit, During the 12-Month PeriodEnding December 31, 2006, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/stats/decO6IBO5DecO6.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
211. I use the term "lower tribunal" because in some cases federal courts reviewed rulings of administrative agencies.
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Rows 1-4 show how often courts vacated arbitration awards. Row 5 shows
how often appellate courts reversed lower court rulings. The statistic in Row 5
provides a good comparison to the reversal rate for arbitration awards-and thereby tests Robert Gilmer's contention that judicial review of arbitration decisions is
too limited to vindicate the public policy purposes behind laws that combat employment discrimination. 2
In Table 1, federal courts in my database vacated an extremely small percentage of arbitration awards. Row 1 shows that district courts vacated awards in 7
out of 152 cases (4.3%). In Row 2, the percentage was substantially similar for
the subset of arbitration awards involving only Title VII claims (2 out of 42, or
4.5%). The only deviation from extreme deference to arbitration awards involved
appellate review of all arbitrator rulings (Row 3), where 9 out of 73 awards were
vacated (10.7%). However, the pattern of extreme deference to awards was also
evident in Title VII arbitrations. This is shown in Row 4, where appellate courts
vacated only 1 out of 21 of these arbitrator rulings (4.8 %).
Taken together, these numbers indicate that lower courts very rarely vacated
arbitration awards, for both general employment-related claims and Title VII
claims. Appellate courts were less deferential to arbitrators than the lower courts,
except in Title VII cases, where the appellate courts were still very deferential.
These findings become more relevant when I compare the deference accorded to
arbitrators and the deference accorded to trial court judges.
To make this comparison, Table 1 shows how federal appellate courts ruled
on judgments that were appealed from district courts. To be clear, I examined
federal court reversal of trial verdicts on statutory employment claims (here, Title
VII), so that my study compares like quantities in the reviewing process. To enable this comparison, Row 5 depicts data from a different source. This row shows
all the federal court rulings made in civil cases in 2006, the most current reporting
period. My objective is to compare this "baseline" of appellate reversal of federal
court adjudications with a similar kind of court action-a ruling that vacates an
arbitrator's ruling in a matter that involves a discrimination claim that arises under
Title VII. In Row 5, the courts terminated 5,917 cases on the merits, and in doing
so, they reversed 764 judgments. This led to a reversal rate of 12.9 percent.
At first glance, federal courts reverse both arbitrators and judges infrequently.
But on closer scrutiny, it is clear that the vacatur rate for arbitrators is much lower-about three times lower-than for all civil court judgments involving identical
claims. Importantly, the 4.3 percent vacatur ruling by district courts for all arbitration awards is exactly one-third of the 12.9 percent figure for all court judgments reversed by appellate courts. These numbers demonstrate that federal
courts treat statutory arbitration awards with much more deference than their own
rulings in district court trials involving the same claims.

212. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Recall that Gilmer confidently
predicted that "although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is
sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute" at issue. Id. (quoting
Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)).
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Table 1"'
Federal Courts
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards and Analogous Civil Court Rulings
Confirm
Arbitrator
Award or
Affirm Court
Judgment

Partly Confirm
Award or
Dismiss,
Remand, Other
Judgment

Vacate
Arbitrator Award
or Reverse Court
Judgment

Total

Row 1
Review All
Awards

152 Arbitrator
Awards
(93.8%)

3 Arbitrator
Awards
(1.9%)

7 Arbitrator
Awards
• (4.3%)

162
Arbitrator
Awards

Row 2
Review
Subset
of Title VII
Awards

42 Arbitrator
Awards
(95.5%)

0

2 Arbitrator
Awards
• (4.5%)

44
Arbitrator
Awards

Row 3
Review
Award

73 Arbitrator
Awards
(86.9%)

2 Arbitrator
Awards
(2.4%)

9 Arbitrator
Awards
• (10.7%)

84
Arbitrator
Awards

Row 4
Review
Subset
of Title VII
Awards

20 Arbitrator
Awards
(95.2%)

0

1 Arbitrator
Award
0 (4.8%)

21
Arbitrator
Awards

Row 5
Review
Civil
Court Ruling

4,679 Trial
Court
Judgments
(79.0%)

474 Trial Court
Judgments
(8.1%)

764 Trial Court
Judgments
(12.9%)

5,917
Trial
Court
Judgments

District
Courts

Appellate
Courts

Table 2 puts the foregoing data in broader perspective. By way of background, my research is designed to measure arbitration award vacatur rates by
federal and state courts at the initial and appellate stages of judicial review. Unless these percentages are extremely low or high, they are hard to interpret. As I
conducted my empirical analysis, I also researched similar studies which provide

213. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 210.
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comparable metrics for appellate courts that review adjudicatory rulings. 214 The
goal is to relate my results to studies that examine appellate court rulings that
reverse tribunals, such as federal courts and agencies that use adjudicatory powers.
Table 2 compares my findings to reversal rates of court, agency, and arbitrator rulings in other studies. This improves my ability to assess whether federal
court deference to arbitration awards is insufficient, moderate, or excessive. I also
note that there is a theoretical basis for this comparison. It tests the Gilmer
Court's conclusion that judicial review of arbitration is sufficient to ensure enforcement of employment discrimination laws.
Table 2 ranks appellate reversal rates in other studies. I created a simple hierarchy for these studies: courts review with extreme deference (reversal rate of
8.0% or less), great deference (reversal rate of 8.1% to 16.0%), considerable deference (reversal rate of 16.1% to 24.0%), moderate deference (reversal rate of
24.1% to 32.0%), slight deference (reversal rate of 32.0% to 40.0%), and no deference (reversal rate of 40.1% or more).

214. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobiain the Appellate Courts: Civil
Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947 (2002); Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseloadand Its Processing, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 287 (2006); James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C.
L. REV. 939 (1996); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Steelworkers
Trilogy and Grievance ArbitrationAppeals: How the FederalCourts Respond, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 78
(1992); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy of Workplace ArbitrationSystems, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 19, 49 tbl. 1 (2001); David
C. Baldus et al., Arbitrarinessand Discriminationin the Administrationof the Death Penalty: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REv. 486 (2002).
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Table 2
Empirical Studies of Appellate Review of Rulings Made by Lower Courts and ALJs
Level of Deference by Appellate Court

Extreme Deference
ReversalRate 8.0% or Less

Reversal Rate by Appellate Court
Do4.3% Vacatur in 7/152 of All
ArbitratorAwards in Sample
Appealed to U.S. District Court
10 4.5% Vacatur in 2/42 of Title VII
ArbitratorAwards in Sample
Appealed to U.S. District Court
6% Reversal of Employer Dismissals of
Employment
Discrimination Lawsuits
(Clermont & Eisenberg, 2002)
7.4% Reversal by U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, 9th Circuit Lower Court
Rulings 2005 (Catterson, 2006)
9.1% Reversal by All U.S. Circuit Courts
of Appeals, 2005 (Catterson, 2006)

GreatDeference
Reversal Rate Between 8.1% and 16.0%

ConsiderableDeference
Reversal Rate Between 16.1% and 24.0%

14.7% Reversal by Federal Appeals
Courts of NLRB Rulings of Union
Liability (Brudney, 1996)
19.7% Reversal by Federal Appeals
Courts of NLRB Rulings of Employer
Liability
(Brudney, 1996)
22.0% Reversal by Federal Appeals
Courts of Jury Patent Rulings (Moore,
2000)
22.0% Reversal by Federal Appeals
Courts of Judges' Patent Rulings (Moore,
2000)
28.2% Reversal by Federal District Courts
of Labor Arbitration Awards, 1960-1991
(LeRoy & Feuille, 2001)

Moderate Deference
Reversal Rate Between 24.1% and 32.0%

Slight Deference
Reversal Rate Between 32.1% and 40.0%
No Deference
Reversal Rate of 40.0% and Above

29.5% Reversal by Federal Appeals
Courts of Labor Arbitration Awards,
1961-1991 (LeRoy & Feuille, 2001)
29.7% Reversal by Federal District Courts
of Labor Arbitration Awards, 1991-2001
(LeRoy & Feuille, 2001)
33.6% Reversal by Federal Appeals
Courts of Labor Arbitration Awards,
1991-2001 (LeRoy & Feuille, 2001)
56% Reversal of Employee Wins in
Employment Discrimination Lawsuits
(Clermont & Eisenberg, 2002)
66% of Death Penalties Reversed in
Nebraska (Baldus, et al., 2002)
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Table 2 paints a clear picture: no published finding shows as much deference
to an adjudicator's ruling as the present study's data on federal court review of
employment arbitration awards. District courts-the first layer of review for
awards under the FAA-vacated 4.3 percent of all arbitration awards and 4.5 percent of all Title VII arbitration awards. This exceeds by three percentage points
the extreme deference of Ninth Circuit appellate courts in Catterson's study.
Similarly, my findings show that courts vacated a somewhat smaller percentage of Title VII employment arbitration awards-4.5 percent-compared to reversing 6.0 percent of dismissal rulings in favor of employers in Title VII lawsuits
in the Clermont and Eisenberg study. Also, I note that in the Clermont and Eisenberg study, appellate courts were the antithesis of deferential in reviewing employee wins in discrimination lawsuits. These courts reversed 56 percent of lower
court rulings in favor of employees. Overall, the appellate courts in Clermont and
Eisenberg's study did not defer to lower court rulings.
Looking at all the other studies in Table 2 reinforces my conclusion that federal court review of employment arbitration awards is extraordinarily deferential.
The fact that there is no comparable finding in any other empirical study suggests
that my study reports an extreme phenomenon.
In Tables 3 and 4, I delve deeper into my database to further explore statutory
and common law arbitrations.
Table 3 shows the various legal issues that arbitrators decided and arranges
them by frequency. Each legal issue has two bars: the solid bar and the shaded
bar, respectively, represent federal and state court review of these awards.
The bar graphs are divided in top and bottom parts. The top shows court rulings on arbitration awards that involved federal employment statutes. The bottom
shows how courts ruled on arbitration awards that involved state common law
claims.
Using Table 3, I determined that Title VII was the most frequently arbitrated
statute in the federal court subset, comprising 26.3 percent of all award-review
cases. 2 16 At the state level, cases involving contract claims were the most frequently arbitrated cases, comprising 52.5 percent of the arbitration caseload.
These findings, in turn, informed my analysis for Table 4.

215. Catterson, supra note 214, at 289.
216. See the last data-entry in the data table near the bottom of Chart A.
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Table 3: Federal & State Court Rulings on Award Challenges by Type of Legal
Issue in Arbitration (Percent of Federal Court and State Court Cases)
Age Discrimination In Employment Act

J

Americans with Disabilities Act
Employee Retirement Income Security Act

[

Federail Rulinae
State Rydings

U.S. Constitution
42 U.S. Code Section 1981 or 1983

Whistieblower Act

CL =Com on Law
SS =State Statute

Fair Labor Standards Act
Family & Medical Leave Act
Unjust Dismissal (CL)
Emotional Distress (CL)
Defamation (CL)
General Torts (CL)

___1

Fraud (CL)
Discrimination (SS)
Whistleblower Act (SS)
Worker's Compensation (SS)
Breach of Contract (CL)

.. ____r

_

_

Tortious Interference with Business (CLI
Wage & Hour Act (SS)
Good Faith & Fair Dealing (CL)
Restrictive Covenant (CL or SS)

Legal Issue in Arbitration Award
Federal Rulings State Rulings
Resitrictiv;e Covenant (Common Law or St ate Statute)
.. 3 .
0.8
Good Faith & Fair Dealing (Common Law)
3.5
-3.3
Wage & Hour Act (State Statute)
1.8
0.8
Tortious Interference with Business (Common Law)
4.1
3.3
Breach of Contract (Common Law) ..
..
34.5
52.5
Worker's Compensation (State Statute)
2.3
0.8
Whistleblower Act (State Statute)
2.3
1.7
Discrimination (State Statute)
_13.5
10.0
2.9
Fraud (Common Law)
3.3
...
3.7
General Torts (Common Law)
6.0
Defamation (Common Law)
5.3__
Emotional Distress (Common Law)
5.3
4.2
Unjust Dismissal (Common Law)
14.0
Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
Whistleblower Act (U.S.)
-------42 U.S.
Code Section 1981 or 1983
U.S. Constitution
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Age Discrimination In Employment Act (ADEA)
Title VII
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2.9

2.9_
1.2

0.8
1.7

2.4

-1.4
0.9

0.6
1.2
5.8

0.8
0.8

10.5
26.3

0

0.8
5.0
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In Table 4, I focused on the sub-sample from Westlaw of 65 federal court rulings on Title VII arbitration awards and compared this result to the 115 state court
rulings on breach of contract arbitration awards. In the state law contract cases
derived from Westlaw, first-level courts enforced 73.0 percent of the awards and
vacated 23.8 percent of the awards. The remaining 3.2 percent were partially
confirmed. Crucial to note, state courts vacated a much higher percentage of
breach of contract awards (23.8 %) compared to federal district courts that vacated
Title VII awards (4.5 %). At the federal and state appellate court levels, the findings were similar.217

Table 4
Comparing Federal Court Review of Arbitration Awards with Title VH Claims
and State Court Review of Breach of Contract Awards
Confirm Award

Partly Confirm
Award

Vacate
Award

Total

Federal District Court
Rulings on Title VII
Awards

42
95.5%

0

2
4.5%

44

Federal Appellate
Court Rulings on Title
VH Awards

20
95.2%

0

1
4.8%

21

State First-Level
Court Rulings on
Breach of Contract
Awards

46
73.0%

2
3.2%

15
23.8%

63

State Appellate Court
Review on Breach of
Contract Awards

35
67.3%

6
11.5%

11
21.2%

52

FEDERAL COURT

STATE COURT

Taken together, what do the statistics show? Arbitrator rulings on Title VII
statutory discrimination claims are more insulated from court review than comparable rulings by federal judges. The level of deference to arbitrator rulings is so
extreme that it verges on rubber stamping. Oddly, when courts review arbitrator
217. I cannot discern from this analysis whether the discrepancy results from contract cases being
compared to Title VII cases, or from differences between federal and state court deference to the
arbitration process. I note, however, that in a companion study, I found that state courts were generally
less deferential in reviewing awards. See LeRoy, Misguided Fairness?,supra note 208.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss1/2

40

LeRoy: LeRoy: Crowning the New King
No. 11

Crowning the New King

rulings on common law claims involving contract principles, they go to the other
extreme, and vacate too many awards-at least when compared to reversal rates in
other circumstances. 218 Gilmer has blinded federal courts to the shift in context
from common law to statutory awards. Seeing no difference in the role that arbitrators play in these very different contexts, federal courts often automatically
defer to the arbitrator's judgment.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTORY RULINGS BY CITIZEN ARBITRATORS
AND ARTICLE I JUDGES
A. ConstitutionalFramersDid Not Envision the Delegation of Article III
Powers to Citizen Arbitrators
Constitutional framers would abhor the idea of delegating Article III powers
to private citizens. As I now show, Gilmer forum substitution disregards basic
constitutional assumptions by presuming that citizen arbitrators are proper substitutes for federal judges.
To begin, the qualifications of arbitrators and federal judges are too different
to support forum substitution. Anticipating the role of Article III judges, Federalist PaperNo. 78 expected Congress to pass a voluminous code of laws. 219 Judges
were bound by strict rules and precedents .2° They needed "long and laborious
study to acquire a competent knowledge ' 221 of the laws.
The portrait of arbitrators is much different. Since the ancient Statute of the
Staple, arbitrators have been selected as citizen experts in commercial codes or
industry mores. While their experience and judgment mattered, they were not
expected to know about legislation. Paying scant attention to arbitrator qualifications, Gilmer ignores prior Supreme Court decisions that evinced a contextual
understanding of the arbitrator's role-for example, the role of labor arbitrators.
The Court, in decisions that pre-dated Gilmer, tacitly implied that these private arbitrators are not chosen because of their knowledge of laws. For example,
in the case of labor arbitrators, the Court said that these individuals bring their
"informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem." 222 The
Court added: "The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the
contract as criteria for judgment. '223 These citizen "judges" understand the intricacies of unionized work.
218. See id. at 604 (state standards for reviewing awards are more conducive to vacating these private
rulings).
219. The Federalist No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
220. Id. at 471.
221. Id.
222. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
223. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
224. Enterprise Wheel & Car. Corp., 363 U.S. at 596 n.2. Notably, the Court used a constitutional
metaphor in explaining that the arbitrator "is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior
authority which the parties are obliged to accept ....He is ratherpart of a system of self-government
created by and confined to the parties (emphasis added)." Warrior & GulfNavigation Corp., 363 U.S.
at 581 (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, arbitrators and federal judges derive their legitimacy from different sources. Over centuries, arbitrators were legitimized by the special confidence that disputants reposed in them. 225 But the Constitutional framers were not
concerned about the public's view of judges. They wanted judges to be perpetually insulated from the whims of legislators and executive officers.
Thus, judges hold their office as long as they adhere to standards of good behavior. Federalist Paper No. 79 explained that political considerations should
never be a disciplinary factor for dismissing a judge: "An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of ability and inability would much oftener give scope to
personal and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice
or the public good." 226 The point is that judicial judgment should not be clouded
by concerns about political recriminations-a concern that does not apply to arbitrators who serve on a case by case basis.
Pay is another important criterion for comparing Article III judges and arbitrators. The Federal Papers defended the policy that protects judges from pay
cuts. Hamilton explained that "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a
power over his will. ' 227 Arbitrator pay varies, but some are likely to be compensated better than federal judges.228
Judges and arbitrators differ by roles, sources of authority, and qualifications.
These differences have implications for judicial review of awards. For centuries,
courts treated arbitration awards with great deference because they recognized the
utility in having citizen experts adjudicate business disputes. Since disputants
selected their arbitrators, it was natural for the FAA to insulate awards from vacatur. This regime of deference cannot be uprooted, however, from its royal prove225. Enterprise Wheel, & Car. Corp., 363 U.S at 599 (explaining that the agreement by unions and
employers to submit disputes to labor arbitrators is founded in their confidence in this neutral's abilities).
226. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
227. Id. Thus, Hamilton spoke of the need to pay judges at pre-determined times, in fixed amounts
that the legislature could never reduce. Id. Recognizing that the value of a set salary could diminish
over time due to inflation, he also explained that the Congress would be authorized to raise the salaries
of judges. Id. In sum, "this provision for the support of the judges ... together with the permanent
tenure of their offices" afforded the best prospect for maintaining judicial independence. Id.
228. See e.g., Rick Bmundrett, Programs Can Help Solve Disputes Mediation,Arbitration Keep Cases
out of South Carolina Court, THE STATE, Mar. 1, 1999, availableat 1999 WLNR 1623761 (stating that
court-appointed arbitrators in South Carolina charge $200 per hour); Margaret A. Jacobs, Renting
Justice: Retired Judges Seize Rising Role in Settling Disputes in California, WALL ST. J., July 26,
1996, at Al (showing that fees of $500 or $600 per hour are not uncommon); Ted Rohrlich, Growing
Use of PrivateJudges Raises Questions of FairnessCourt, L.A. TMES, Dec. 26, 2000, at Al (reporting that arbitrators charge between $250 and $600 per hour, thereby denying access to arbitration for
poor litigants); see also Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 432 n.189 (1996) (noting that an arbitrator
charged a $9,000 fee in a dispute that resulted in a $15,000 award). Some court opinions also reveal
the growing expense of arbitration fees. See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d
1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding an arbitration agreement unenforceable under the FAA because it required the employee to pay half of the arbitrator's fees, estimated at $1,875 - $5,000); Davis
v. LPK Corp., 1998 WL 210262 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (denying enforcement of an arbitration agreement
that would obligate the Title VII plaintiff to pay one-half of the arbitration fee, estimated to be $2,000
per day). The fact that arbitrator pay is often greater than for judges implies, at first blush, the arbitrators are more valued for their legal acumen. A more likely explanation, however, is the higher per diem
rate reflects the temporary and fleeting nature of the work performed by an arbitrator. Once the arbitrator makes a ruling, she isffunctus officio. Unless she is appointed in another case, she will never again
serve as an arbitrator.
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nance and common law foundation and transplanted to mandatory arbitrations of
statutory claims. Arbitrators cannot be substitutes for federal judges in cases dealing with statutory claims rather than common law claims.
B. JudicialReview Standards under the FAA Are More Deferential
to ArbitrationAwards than FRCP Standardsfor
FederalDistrict Court Judgments
Appellate review of federal district court judgments is governed by Rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures ("FRCP"). This rule permits a
finding of fact to be overturned only if it is clearly erroneous. 229 Although highly
deferential, this standard still provides appellate courts with more latitude to correct a judge's fact-finding compared to arbitration.
The FAA does not have an explicit fact-reviewing standard. The matter is regulated by federal common law. The Supreme Court, in the leading precedential
case, Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, declared that when "an
arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the application of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator's 'improvident, even silly, factfmding'
does not
,,230
provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.
Insofar as
courts must defer to unsound fact-finding in arbitration awards, the FAA insulates
arbitrators more than the FRCP shields judges from appellate review.
After district courts make mixed findings of fact and law, or findings of law,
appellate courts may correct errors of law. 231 This differs from court review of
arbitration awards. The FAA provides no express power to correct legal errors in
these awards. In some federal circuits, courts apply a narrower arbitration award
review standard, manifest disregard of the law. 3 While this common law standard can lead to vacatur, it occurs only when the arbitrator "appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it."' 233

In sum, the manifest disregard standard is exceedingly narrow.

Some circuits do not even allow for this extremely limited form of review of arbi229. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) ("Setting Aside the Findings. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility").
230. 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987)).
231. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984) ("Rule 52(a) does not
inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including those that may infect a so-called
mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the
governing rule of law").
232. E.g., LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Kanuth v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
233. DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (quoting DiRussa v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 825 (2d Cir. 1997)). DiRussa is an example where a court
hinted that arbitrators made an uncorrectable legal error. 121 F.3d at 825. An age discrimination complainant was awarded $220,000, but his request for attorney's fees-totaling $249,050-was denied.
Id. at 820. In his motion to vacate that part of the award, DiRussa argued that the arbitrators manifestly
disregarded the ADEA's policy for granting attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Id. The Second
Circuit disagreed, stating: "the remedy for that does not lie with us." Id. at 823. The court continued
that "'knowing' all of the provisions of a particular statutory scheme without assistance from the
parties is a daunting task, even for a skilled lawyer or judge." Id.
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234

tral awards.
A district court's legal findings are subject to de novo review.235 This standard is significantly broader than the FAA standards for reviewing arbitration
236
awards. To illustrate, the Supreme Court rebuked lower courts, in W.R. Grace,
Misco,237 Eastern Associated Coal,238 and Garey,239 for vacating arbitration
awards on the judge's general belief that the arbitration award was contrary to the
law. The Court said that an arbitration award may be vacated under the public
policy exception only if "the contract as interpreted by [the arbitrator] violates
some explicit public policy." 4° The Court further narrowed the vacatur standard
by emphasizing that a "public policy ...must be well-defined and dominant, and
is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests. ''24I In sum, the Court recognized that some arbitration awards tend to be at odds with a particular policy-for
example, when an arbitrator reinstates an employee who tests positive for illicit
drugs on the job-but, according to the Court, this fact should not undermine the
234. The standard has been adopted by the Second Circuit (Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d
Cir. 1978)); Fourth Circuit (Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2006));
Fifth Circuit (Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003));
Sixth Circuit (Buchignani v. Vining Sparks IBG, 208 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 2000)); Ninth Circuit (Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991)). A Tenth Circuit district
court used the standard in Durkin v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Corp., 986 F.Supp. 1356, 1357-58
(D. Kan. 1997). See also Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon, & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
Judge Posner expressed strong doubts about the manifest disregard standard, noting: "We can understand neither the need for the formula nor the role that it plays in judicial review of arbitration (we
suspect none- that it is just words). If it is meant to smuggle review for clear error in by the back
door, it is inconsistent with the entire modem law of arbitration." Id.
235. Eg., Doe v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998)
236. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic
Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757 (1983). The employer had entered into a consent decree with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission that required the company to maintain its extant proportion of
women and blacks in the work force in the event of layoffs to remedy past sex and race discrimination
at its Corinth, Mississippi plant. Id. at 759. A year after entering into the decree, the employer needed
to lay off part of its work force and, consistent with the decree, protected females and blacks by laying
off white males. Id. at 761. Having more seniority than the protected employees, white males filed a
grievance to vindicate this contractual right. Id. After being compelled by federal courts to arbitrate
this grievance, the company lost at arbitration. Id. at 762-64. The arbitrator ruled that the employer
breached the CBA, notwithstanding the consent decree, and awarded the affected employees damages
rather than reinstatement. Id. at 763-64.
The district court vacated the award, but was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local Union No. 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 652 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1981). In ordering confirmation of the award, the Supreme Court
showed how deference to an award differs from judicial review of a legal claim adjudicated by a trial
court:
[The arbitrator's] analysis of the merits of the grievances is entitled to... deference. He found
that the collective bargaining agreement provided no good faith defense to claims of violations of
the seniority provisions, and gave him no authority to weigh in some other fashion the Company's good faith. Again, although conceivably we could reach a different result were we to interpret the contract ourselves, we cannot say that the award does not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
461 U.S. at 765-66.
237. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,42-43 (1987).
238. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
239. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).
240. WR. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766.
241. Id (quoting Muschany v. U.S., 324 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1945)).
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finality of awards.
VII. CROWNING THE NEW KING? THE STATUTORY ARBITRATOR AND THE
DEMISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The King's Arbitrator:Royal Origins and Regal Deference
Western civilization traces arbitration to King Solomon's ingenious resolution of a maternity dispute. 242 More recently, the English monarchy and courts
cooperated with merchants to fashion our present system of reviewing arbitration
awards. 243 To regain perspective, recall that nearly 700 years ago, small merchants traded goods at fairs that operated under a royal franchise. In that primitive
economy, the fair raised revenue for the throne while providing an essential market for producers and consumers. Arbitrators improved the efficiency of those
markets as they adjudicated transactional disputes. By authorizing merchant arbitrators in the Statute of the Staple of 1353, the king delegated his sovereign power
to ensure the success of the fair.
At two prominent junctures-in 1698, and again in 1925-lawmakers in England and the U.S., respectively, believed that court litigation hampered commerce.
They enacted similar statutes to compel courts to enforce arbitration agreements
and confirm awards. The laws allowed courts to vacate awards only if these private rulings were tainted by gross unfairness. But they shielded awards from ordinary appellate review. Vacatur of an award required extraordinary proof of
arbitrator misconduct, corruption, or procurement. Such deference grew out of
practical considerations; the parties had chosen the arbitrator, agreed to the private
process, and abided by a commercial code.
I suggest that courts deferred so heavily to arbitration awards because William II took an active role in shaping the autonomy of these merchant courts. By
my view, these arbitrators were judicial proxies for the king. The extreme deference in the Arbitration Act's review standards reflected William III's infallibility.
A court could not review an award for fact-finding errors or legal defects.
Chart A, supra, demonstrates how the FAA's reviewing standards directly
descended from expressions in William III's arbitration statute. Thus, I conclude
that our law crowns the arbitrator with the king's mantle of infallibility. In statistical analysis, I showed that federal courts review arbitration awards with nearly
blind deference. My point is that these statistical measures suggest that modern
courts conform to the infallibility premise. Consider whether these excerpts from
contemporary courts treat arbitrators as royal proxies:
- "The arbiter was chosen to be the Judge. That Judge has spoken. There
242. See 1 Kings 3:16-28 (King James) (reporting King Solomon's stratagem of suggesting that a
baby be cut inhalf to dispose of a maternity dispute, and his award of the contested infant to the woman who agreed to surrender her son rather than see him killed).
243. A similar theme appears in Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37
YALE L.J. 595, 598 (1928). Commenting more generally on the relationship between courts, arbitrations, and English kings, Sayre concluded: "Perhaps the main purposes of the King's justice were
political and financial, in consolidating and unifying the kingdom and in brining fees into the royal
treasury." Id.
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24

. "Judicial review of arbitration awards is tightly limited; perhaps it
ought not to be called 'review' at all." 245
- "'[M]aximum deference is owed to the arbitrator's decision' and the
standard 24of6 review of arbitration awards 'is among the narrowest known
to law."
* "[T]he court's function in confirming or vacating an arbitration award
is severely limited. 2" 7
- "Judicial intrusion is restricted to the extraordinary situations indicating abuse of arbitral
power or exercise of power beyond the jurisdiction
248
of the arbitrator."
My empirical research confirms this textual impression. When federal district
courts reviewed employment arbitration awards in my sample from 1977 through
February 2008, they vacated only 4.3 percent of these rulings-and just 4.5 percent of Title VII awards. By comparison, in the most recent reporting period for
federal courts, appellate courts reversed district courts in 12.9 percent of all civil
cases.
My historical and empirical evidence paints an unsettling constitutional picture. Following Gilmer, arbitration is not necessarily a consensual process. Often, it is mandatory, particularly in the employment context. This violates the
consensus principle that governed arbitration for centuries. This deviation has
constitutional import when a compulsory arbitration rules on a statutory right.
Not only does this process depart from the mercantile and contractual province of
arbitration, but it treads upon the delegated duties of Article III judges.
Gilmer falsely equates litigation and arbitration, and judges and arbitrators,
when it espouses its theory of forum substitution. Because federal courts review
arbitration awards more narrowly than they review rulings in Article III trials,
legal errors committed by arbitrators are likely to stand, while the same errors
committed by judges are more likely to be reversed and corrected. The root problem is that congressional laws receive unequal application, interpretation, and
enforcement when they are diverted to a private forum that is shielded from meaningful review. Constitutional framers would perceive this recent development as
a usurpation of Article III power.

244. McClure v. Montgomery County Cmty.Action Agency, 1975 WL 181652, at * 4 (1975) (quoting
Safeway Stores v. Am. Bakery & Confectionery Workers, Local 111,390 F.2d 79, 84 (5th Cir. 1968)).
245. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1997).
246. Durkin v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Corp., 986 F.Supp. 1356, 1358 (D. Kan. 1997) (quoting ARW
Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1995)).
247. Booth v. Hume Pub., Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 932 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805. 808 (2d Cir. 1960)).
248. Landmark v. Mader Agency, Inc., 878 P.2d 773, 776 (Idaho 1994).
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B. Conclusions and ProposedSolutions
An obvious implication of my study is to amend the FAA's award-reviewing
standards. A logical approach is to provide the same form of judicial review for
statutory awards and in civil court rulings. This would seem to restore the constitutional check against errors of law that might otherwise elude correction.
But this prescription would ignore centuries of great judicial deference to arbitration awards, dating back the Arbitration Act of 1698. Thus, this policy
change would be precipitous. By deterring the use of arbitration, it would worsen
the backlog of Article III court dockets. It would also undermine the informality
of arbitration-and its attendant benefits of lower cost, speed, and efficiency-by
exposing these loose tribunals to withering scrutiny. Arbitrations would morph
into court-like proceedings, thereby losing their procedural advantages.
Legislation to limit Gilmer is a better approach. Currently, a bill proposes to
make mandatory arbitration agreements unenforceable under the FAA. 249 If
passed, it would restore arbitration to its consensual foundations by only allowing
for enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards that result from genuine
negotiation.
But this approach has costs and risks. The federal court system has serious
problems, including intense partisanship that undermines the appointment
process, 250 failure to expand judgeships in response to the nation's expanding
population, and the need for new courts. 25' Any limit on Gilmer would probably
divert disputes involving statutory claims to a flooded litigation channel that is not
built for this capacity. It is hard to see how the constitutional problem of judicial
review-in particular, ensuring that legislative enactments are enforced-would
be fixed by denying or delaying disputants any kind of a hearing on their statutory
claims.
I offer prosaic but more effective solutions. I suggest re-examination of two
existing approaches. First, judges should take a closer look at arbitration awards
that are challenged on grounds that they violate public policy. Often, these appeals are specious and vague and must be rejected. 52 But there are a few cases
where the award clearly contradicts a statutory provision or a judicial precedent.
In these cases, the court should vacate the award.
Tassin v. Ryan's Family Steakhouse, Inc.253 is a case in point. A woman alleged in a lawsuit that she was sexually harassed at work in Louisiana. 254 Relying
on a mandatory arbitration agreement that Tassin had executed, Ryan's Family
Steakhouse won a court order to compel her to arbitrate her claim. 255 Meanwhile,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Goins v. Ryan's Family Steakhouse,
Inc. that the employer's standard arbitration agreement was unenforceable under
249. See H.R. 1020, 111 th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 12, 2009).
250. See, e.g., David S. Law, Appointing FederalJudges: The President,the Senate, and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479 (2005).
251. Catterson, supra note 214, at 287-88.
252. E.g., Henneberry v. ING Capital Advisors, LLC, 831 N.Y.S.2d 378, 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)
(court summarily rejected employee's claim that the award upholding her termination violated a strong
public policy).
253. 509 F. Supp. 2d 585 (M.D. La. 2007).
254. Id. at 587.
255. Id.
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Texas law because the agreement lacked consideration.25 6 Still, Tassin proceeded
to arbitration and lost. 257 In challenging her award, she contended that her arbitration was the product of the same unconscionable agreement that the Fifth Circuit
refused to enforce in Texas.2
Apparently, the Tassin district court was not aware of the unpublished Goins
decision; the only party who seemed to know about the ruling was the employer's
attorney. 59 Nonetheless, the district court denied Tassin's motion to vacate, even
though the court readily conceded that "the Court was and continues to be concerned that counsel for the defendant [Ryan's Family Steakhouse], whose firm
was also counsel of record in the Goins case, did not bring the Goins decision to
the attention of the plaintiff and the Court when the decision was entered.",260 By
any reasonable reading of the public policy basis for reviewing awards, the Tassin
court should have vacated the award.
In addition, my study should encourage federal circuit courts that do not use
the manifest disregard standard to adopt this approach. Adoption of this standard
would not require courts to abandon their long-standing deference to awards.
Rather, the manifest disregard standard allows vacatur only when an arbitrator
"appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to
ignore or pay no attention to it."261 This approach would serve to check arbitrators
who knowingly misapply the law. It would also prevent arbitrations from generating outcomes that subvert the will of Congress.
For centuries, courts have managed tensions between private and public tribunals. My research shows a public policy consensus that favors narrow court
review of arbitration awards. In a new finding, I show how the deferential principles in the FAA derive from statutory and common law sources that originated
in the Arbitration Act of 1698. Describing how arbitration has evolved from royal
origins, I merely retell a story from an earlier generation of scholars. Paul Sayre
recognized, for example, the relationship between royal authority and modern
arbitration.262

256. Id. at 587-88 (citing Goins v. Ryan's Family Steakhouse, Inc., 181 Fed.Appx. 435 (5th Cir.
2006)).
257. Id. at 588.
258. Id. at 589.
259. id. at 587 n.7.
260. Id.
261. E.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 459,462 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The court vacated
the panel's denial of attorney's fees because the arbitrators "appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly
governing legal principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it." Id. at 462.
262. A similar theme appears in Sayre, supra note 243.
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